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Summary
This thesis builds on quantitative British politics scholarship with four papers unified
by a strong emphasis on positivist theory, research design and cutting edge statistical
methodology. I examine political behaviour among representatives in the UK’s House
of Commons and voting behaviour in the 2016 EU Referendum. I show that the
UK parliamentary system’s reliance on strong party discipline has important adverse
consequences for public approval. Firstly, I show how high-salience debates such
Prime Minister’s Questions bring out the worst behaviours in MPs. As parties’
access to the floor (ability to make speeches) is reduced, MP behaviour becomes
more aggressive. Secondly, with co-authors, I examine the conditions under which
ideologically extreme MPs are more likely to vote against their party. We find that
the impact of such behaviour affects party unity more often when in government,
meaning that parties are more likely to appear united until they elected, at which
point party divides become more apparent once again. Thirdly, I show that career
progression in the House of Commons rewards ‘insider’ behaviour such as increased
attendance and participation in House of Commons debate and a focus on national
rather than local issues. The power political parties have over the future of political
leadership tends to centralise power and reward party politicians to whom the general
public feels no strong affinity. In the final paper, we analyse voting behaviour during
the 2016 EU Referendum assessing the potential effect of rainfall on the referendum
result. We find that if the referendum had occurred on a sunny day, the likely result
would have widened the margin of victory for Vote Leave. In the most comprehensive
statistical analysis of the referendum to date, we concur with earlier analyses that
that the surprise result was driven by strong Brexit support in districts of economic
and social deprivation, particularly in rural and suburban locations.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The word ‘behaviour’, when referring to Members of Parliament in the British House
of Commons, is often preceded by negative adjectives: ‘pathetic’, ‘jeering’, ‘grim’
or ‘silly’ (Hansard Society, 2014, pp. 5-7, 15). Political trust and engagement has
been in steady decline (Phillips and Simpson, 2015; Whiteley et al., 2016) and the
government’s failure to fully appreciate the causes and magnitude of support for
Brexit (Goodwin and Heath, 2016; Inglehart and Norris, 2016) has resulted in one of
the largest constitutional crises in modern British history.
This thesis sets out to make a contribution to the understanding of how British
politics functions from the perspective of both politicians and the general public. Its
purpose is to understand why British political behaviour (increasingly viewed on all
sides as incomprehensible) – is the result of the aggregation of ‘rational’ decisions at the
individual level. The thesis examines British politics from a positivist, theoretically-
driven, data-analytic perspective. They examine political behaviour, both by elites
and voters, through applying cutting-edge statistical methods including quantitative
text analysis, advanced estimation and model-based simulation techniques, geographic
information systems (GIS), and exploiting natural experiments to estimate causal
effects.
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1.0.1 Four Studies in British Politics
This thesis is divided in to four studies. The first three studies share a common theme
in that they discuss different aspects of behaviour in the House of Commons, while
the fourth paper analyses voting behaviour in the 2016 Referendum on Membership
of the European Union. Each study answers a separate question in British politics
question using different theoretical constructs and datasets. I introduce each question
below, summarising the motivations, methods and findings.
Why, for example, are British politicians so rude to each other in the debating
chamber? Focus groups reviewing parliamentary debate have called the proceedings
‘a pantomime’, ‘infantile’, ‘about party point-scoring’, ‘a joke’, and ‘great for tourists,
crap for the country’ (Hansard Society, 2014, pp. 27-36). This is a subject that
requires more significant examination to enable a better understanding of its cause,
impact and consequences. My first study, contained in Chapter 2 of the thesis
examines the phenomenon of partisanship at Prime Ministers Questions, showing
that a party’s level of access to the floor – beyond an MP’s individual dislike for a
political opponent – is a deciding factor in how aggressively partisan s/he will be to
a rival party. Exploiting a natural experiment in the random allocation of questions
to backbenchers during Prime Minister’s Questions, Chapter 2 finds that as access
to the plenary is restricted, parties focus their behaviour on aggressively partisan
questioning. Somewhat ironically, the more desperate parties are to be heard, the
more aggressive they become and the less appealing they are to members of the
general public.
Why do MPs occasionally vote against their own party? Traditionally, strong
party discipline is a core feature of Westminster parliamentary systems and parties
typically compel MPs to support the party regardless of MPs’ individual preferences.
Rebellion, however, does occur. The second study, within Chapter 31 uses an original
dataset of MP votes and speeches in the British House of Commons from 1992 to
2015, coupled with new estimations of MPs’ ideological positions within their party.
We find that MPs use rebellion strategically to differentiate themselves from their
1co-authored with Jonathan Slapin, Justin Kirkland, Joseph Lazzaro and Tom O’Grady.
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party, contingent upon an interaction of ideological extremity with party control of
government. Extremists are loyal when their party is in the opposition, but these
same extremists become more likely to rebel when their party controls government.
Additionally, they typically emphasise their rebellion through speeches, making their
opinions on the vote clear to their constituents.
From backbenchers to aspiring prime ministers, how and why do we end up with
our political leadership? My third study, within Chapter 4 examines the allocation of
MPs to leadership roles in the House of Commons. I propose four potential factors
that predict promotion, which are derived from the speeches of MPs in their first term:
participation, policy specialisation, focus on local issues, and confidence. I test these
measures in three models of career progression: these comprise promotion to a position
in government or opposition, time to first promotion, and seniority of first promotion.
I find strong empirical support for the effect of parliamentary speechmaking on
career progression in the House of Commons. The strongest association shows that
participation in the debating chamber is associated with improved career prospects,
as are (to a lesser extent) confident speech patterns. Conversely, an increased focus
on local representation are associated with decreased chances of promotion. Crucially,
this pattern of behaviour holds for MPs who are promoted to become ministers, but
does not hold for MPs who go on to become whips. This suggests that party leaders
pay attention to the performance of their members and assign promotions according
to the relevant skills required of each parliamentary role. The implication of this
behavioural analysis is that British parliamentary politics rewards political insiders,
often referred to as politicians of the ‘machine’. In contrast, populist MPs, who are
likely to end up as the perennial ‘rebels’ of Chapter 4.
Finally, the question: can the 2016 Brexit result be attributed to freakish weather
conditions? According to the fourth study, contained in Chapter 5 2, almost certainly
not. Previous studies have shown that weather conditions may affect voter turnout,
sometimes in ways that could plausibly swing the result of a close election. On the
day of Britain’s EU referendum, the presence of torrential rain in the South-East of
England and Northern Ireland raised concern in the media that voter turnout could
2Co-authored with Barıs¸ Arı
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be affected in a manner that favoured the Vote Leave campaign (Knapton, 2016;
Aron, 2016). To answer this question, Chapter 5 takes data at the polling district
level and overlays interpolated rainfall data using geographic information system
(GIS) technology. Our analysis shows that the rain had the greatest effect on the
leave vote, reducing the Brexiteer tally by as many as 3,566 votes in one district.
However, rainfall’s effect on the wider referendum was far more limited. We find
that if the Referendum had taken place on a sunny day, there would have been no
significant change to the overall result. The leave campaign did, of course, prevail by
a far wider margin than any analyst dared to predict before the fact and we find (as
do many other studies on Brexit) that the surprise result to the EU Referendum had
its roots not in adverse weather conditions, but in unchecked support from areas seen
as peripheral by central government.
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Chapter 2
PMQs: Access to the Floor
and Aggression in the
Chamber
2.1 Introduction
This chapter seeks to explain variation in levels of adversarial questioning between
political parties during Prime Minister’s Questions (PMQs). To be specific, parties
vary in the proportion of questions that attack the members or policies of a rival
party. For example, during PMQs held on Wednesday 3rd February 2016, the Labour
Party used every question allocated to its backbenchers to attack government policy.
A typically partisan line was taken by John Mann, Labour backbencher for Bassetlaw:
“Is that it? Is that the best that the Prime Minister can do? There
is nothing for British pensioners and nothing for British workers . . . the
Prime Minister’s . . . plan relies on more than a million new migrants
entering this country before 2020. Has he got the bottle to confirm that
inconvenient truth?”
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Just a month earlier on the 6th of January, however, Labour attacked government
policy in only one third of its questions. The rest of the questions represented a
diversity of approaches, idiosyncratic to the interests of each member. For example
George Howarth (Lab, Knowsley) asks:
“The Prime Minister might know that Knowsley also has a Shakespeare
connection? . . . Will he lend his support to the proposal for a Shake-
spearean theatre of the north to complete the triangle: The Globe The-
atre, Stratford-on-Avon and Knowsley – in a celebration of Shakespeare’s
work?”
Why did Labour’s apparent resolve to hold the government to account change
so drastically within a month? This study argues that allocation of plenary time
is the key to answering this question. At PMQs, high demand for plenary time
has resulted in the random allocation of questions to applicants. In both debates
referenced above, Labour MPs applied in similar numbers, and relative to the total
number of applications that week, could have expected to be granted a similar number
of questions (five in January and six in February). However, the randomised ballot
allocated Labour MPs nine questions in January but just three questions in February.
In both cases, Labour asked the same number of partisan questions (three) to the
prime minister.
This observation is illustrative of a systematic relationship found in a natural
experiment derived from data granted by the Speakers Office of the House of Commons.
The relationship is stated as follows: For each party of significant size, as access to
the plenary session is withdrawn, there is an increase in the proportion of partisan
questions. To explain this relationship, I adopt a framework of party unity, arguing
that partisanship in parliamentary debate (here defined as questions that attack a
rival party) can be interpreted in analogy to parliamentary voting. The greater the
proportion of questions from that divide debate explicitly on party lines, the more
unified is that party in opposing their political rival. I then adapt the theory of the
plenary bottleneck (Cox, 2006), using the logic of plenary time as finite resource to
show how parties respond to periods of plenary scarcity by encouraging their MPs to
6
toe the party line during legislative debate.
The findings of this chapter have significance for (i) voters, (ii) political parties, and
(iii) policy conventions for legislative debate and reform of the format of PMQs. First,
legislative debate in the UK (in particular PMQs) is seen by citizens as problematic in
a way that suggests that ‘over-polarization’ may be partly to blame. A study carried
out by the Hansard Society found that representative focus group attendees saw
PMQs as ‘a pantomime’, ‘infantile’, ‘about party point-scoring’, ‘a joke’, and ‘great
for tourists, crap for the country’ (Hansard Society, 2014, pp. 27-36). Crucially, 67%
of participants agreed there was too much party political point scoring, compared to
just 5% who disagreed (p. 47).
Second, party leaders from both Government and Opposition recognise the public
relations problem created by the partisan atmosphere at PMQs. When Jeremy Corbyn
was first elected leader of the Labour Party and the official opposition in September
2015, he began his first session as David Cameron’s opposite number at the despatch
box. He argued for the adoption of an approach to PMQs characterised by more
respectful debate of issues relevant to the general public. It wasn’t the first time a
party leader had called for a ‘reboot’ of the debate format. Corbyn’s predecessor,
Ed Miliband had argued for the same on his appointment, but by the end of his
tenure both Miliband and Cameron had reverted to a more combative debating style.
Speaking on the issue, Cameron admits that:
“[Ending] ‘Punch and Judy’ at PMQs was a promise I wasn’t able to
deliver. I tried a quieter approach and frankly, it didn’t really work. The
Commons can be a bit of a bear pit at times, so you have to be robust.”
(Hansard Society, 2014, p. 50)
Thirdly, this study, by highlighting the effect that demand on plenary time can
have on partisanship, suggests that a potential solution to the problem may be found
through efforts to increase the supply of ‘high-value’ plenary time. Indeed, there have
been moves to increase the running time of PMQs in the hope of ameliorating excessive
partisanship during the House’s most widely viewed political debate. Speaker John
Bercow argues that in order to account for “the numerous disruptions in the noisy
7
chamber”, PMQs should be extended to last for one hour (Casalicchio, 2017). An
extension to the time allowed for the format is justified by the findings of this chapter,
and if enacted, ought to provide ample opportunity to further test the effect of plenary
access on partisanship in the House of Commons.
2.2 Literature: Party Unity, Time Scarcity and
Speechmaking
Time as a Legislative Resource and Party Unity
Studies of party unity in terms of legislative politics often overlook the impact of time
scarcity, shown to have considerable importance in determining legislative outcomes
(Linz, 1998; Goetz and Meyer-Sahling, 2009). Do¨ring (1995; 2001) theorises time as
a scarce resource for political parties, and as a crucial arena for party competition
and control. Conceptually, the impact of time constraints on party behaviour can be
surmised in terms of the plenary bottleneck and the legislative state of nature (Cox,
2006).
A legislative state of nature is characterised by no limits on the rights of members
to debate and by extension delay legislation. As legislatures become busy and time
is scarce, gridlock would result if there were no limits to the rights of members to
delay bills indefinitely. Agenda setting powers (Cox and McCubbins, 2005; 2007)
therefore limit minority rights and limit the number of bills to those with a good
chance of passing with a majority. Procedural conventions, such as anti-filibustering
rules further limit the ability of minority parties to delay the passage of legislation
into law. Binder (1996) finds evidence connecting legislative workload (that is, the
pressure to pass increasing amounts of legislation) in the US House resulted in the
curtailing of minority party rights to delay legislation. Martin (2004) shows that the
more time left in a parliamentary term, the more quickly politically salient issues are
passed through parliament. Similarly, Giannetti et al. (2016) show that Italian parties
intentionally allocate more debate time for bills that are likely to be controversial.
However, there are few studies relating time as a resource to party unity. Some
8
examples explore the relationship between periods within a politician’s career and
party loyalty. To be specific, once politicians have made the decision to retire or have
been overlooked for promotion, they no longer have the incentive to toe the party
line, and so are more likely to cross the floor (Figlio, 1995; Benedetto and Hix, 2007).
In their study of parliamentary voting in the European Parliament, Hix et al.
(2005) observe that voting unity among party groups has increased over time alongside
the political and legal importance of the legislature, but cannot conclusively isolate
demand on legislative time as a determining factor. Yet the importance of time
scarcity in creating incentives for party discipline are clear: if infinite time existed for
the passage of each bill, then there would be no limit to the number of votes that
could be taken on a given bill. Cohesive voting would not be a requisite for legislative
success, as it is in modern parliamentary democracy.
Partisan Questions as Party Unity in Speech Form
Studies of party unity normally analyse legislative voting as a highly visible and mea-
surable consequence of cohesion. The level of party unity in legislative voting between
democracies depends on institutional structures that produce different incentives for
elected representatives to toe the party line. Carey (2007; see also Hix et al. 2005;
and Sieberer 2006) demonstrates that voting unity is lower in systems that promote
intra-party competition, thus prioritising electoral competition over party loyalty. In
the US House, personal vote seeking ensures that parties have minimal capacity to
control legislator voting after bills are put to the floor (Krehbiel, 1993; Cox and Poole,
2002; Krehbiel, 2010), while – in the UK – voting against the party whip is rare and
voting unity is high (Cowley, 2005; Spirling and McLean, 2007; Kam, 2009).
Within countries, party unity may differ between parties too, according to candi-
date selection rules and opportunities for promotion (Sieberer, 2006; Depauw and
Martin, 2009; Kam, 2009). Majority-minority conditions also affect the extent to
which ideologically extreme legislators are willing to vote against their own party
(Slapin et al., 2018; Kirkland and Slapin, 2017), with parties in the majority rebelling
more frequently than minority parties.
Analysis of party unity is not confined to parliamentary voting, however, and recent
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scholarship shows that party unity and legislative time (in the form of speechmaking)
are intimately connected. Proksch and Slapin (2012; 2015) argue that speechmaking is
an important legislative resource that may be retained by party leadership or delegated
to backbenchers, with comparative differences between parliamentary systems being
driven by the incentive to create a personal vote. Legislative speech and voting
are similarly aligned as indicators of party unity. Indeed, instances of disloyalty in
legislative voting are often accompanied by explanatory speeches (Slapin et al., 2018).
In voting divisions, party unity is defined as the proportion of MPs of a given
party voting in the same direction against an opposing party or group of parties.
It is not immediately clear how this translates to speechmaking, which may take a
practically infinite number of political and semantic positions, far removed from the
binary choice of parliamentary voting. The task at hand, therefore, is to define a
satisfactory proxy for party discipline that classifies MP speeches in terms of an MP’s
commitment to her own party as well as opposing the position of the rival party.
Scales of local/national focus (Killermann and Proksch, 2013; Kellermann, 2016,
see also Chapter 4) or of ‘discourse quality’ (Ba¨chtiger et al., 2005) are related to
party unity, but are conceptually distinct. A satisfactory measure of party unity in
speechmaking should be derived from an aggregation of binary choices – as is voting
unity. It should also classify each question in terms of its political position with
regard to a rival party. When voting with the party line, by definition, an MP chooses
to oppose their rival party in the legislature. Similarly, if a MP’s speech denounces
a rival party, then the MP makes a clear statement of party loyalty, analogous to
voting loyalty at the ballot box. I argue that the more parliamentary speech reflects
this partisan style of questioning, the more we might classify legislative speech as
expressly party political and reflective of an underlying logic of party unity.
Party Unity as a Function of Time-Scarcity and Political Speech
How far should an MP value their right to ask whatever question they like? Conversely,
how much partisanship is enough - should a party force all its members to speak against
their rival party? As the supply of plenary time to a political party is withdrawn, the
ability of the party to exert influence on members increases. In Westminster systems,
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the party has a large degree of control over promotion to parliamentary positions
and a high level of influence over a member’s prospects for re-election. Indeed, party
loyalty is far less reliable when members see few opportunities for further advancement
within their party (Benedetto and Hix, 2007), and the development of the cabinet
and ministry in 19th century Britain induced party loyalty from ambitious party
members with promises of advancement (Eggers and Spirling, 2016).
In addition, as a party’s access to the floor is restricted, successful applicants bear
a burden of responsibility to act as representatives of both the party and of like minded
MPs whose applications were not successful. Parties, as the principal coordinators
of like minded groups in the House, are able to leverage this responsibility, steering
members to lines of questioning that best highlight political cleavages between groups
(and therefore common ground within groups), resulting in a partisan approach to
questioning.
On the other hand, once the supply of plenary time increases past a certain point,
it is not in a party’s interest to insist that all speeches attack the opposition if doing
so means sacrificing other lines of questioning of value to its members. Just as there
is less need for governments to whip dissenting MPs if their majority is assured, once
a point has been made sufficiently in debate, repetition ad nauseam does not win
the argument. Persuading MPs to divert from their ideal line of questioning is not
cost free – if members feel taken advantage of, they may be less willing to support
the party leadership in the future. Second, as groups of MPs get larger, effective
coordination without contractual obligations becomes more difficult (Olson, 1965),
meaning party leaders will have a harder time getting all successful applicants to act
according to the party’s wishes. After all, the random ballot is designed specifically
for backbench MPs to bring up questions of interest to them – not the parties.
In summary, by theorising plenary time as the property of parliamentary parties
– to be delegated to individual legislators depending on parliamentary conditions
(Proksch and Slapin 2012; 2015) – the effect of fluctuations in the relative value of
individual speeches is analogous to legislative voting. In the United Kingdom, whips
communicate the urgency of attendance for a vote in Parliament by the number of
lines underneath voting instructions to MPs. As the importance of a vote increases,
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so too does the party influence on MPs to toe the party line. Similarly, we might
expect that, as the importance of access-to-the-floor increases, party influence on MP
behaviour will increase too.
2.3 Research Design
2.3.1 Prime Minister’s Questions: Types of Question and
Their Role
Each week, while Parliament is in session, PMQs is held at 12pm on Wednesdays.
The institution is perhaps the most important platform for opposition scrutiny in
the British Parliament (Bevan and John, 2016) as it gives opposition parties the
opportunity to question directly the leader of the government on national and local
issues. The debate is broadcast on live national television and radio, and typically
lasts 40-45 minutes, a time allocation which has risen sharply in recent years.1
There are four types of questions asked of the prime minister: (i) randomised, (ii)
leaders’, (iii) government, and (iv) discretionary. The first type of question (on which
this chapter focuses) is the randomised question. MPs who wish to ask questions
of the prime minister may apply to a random ballot, which is usually carried out
one week in advance of the debate. The successful applicants are informed and are
therefore given one week to prepare for their appearance on live national television
and radio. MPs expect to benefit from an exchange with the prime minister in their
own constituency via subsequent reporting in local media. If questions are of broader
appeal, an MP may also expect to benefit from repeated coverage in the national
media.
Leaders’ questions are allocated to Labour and the Scottish National Party. Each
leader is granted a number of questions roughly proportional to their representation
in the House, and typically follow a strictly partisan line of questioning. The leader of
1Scholarship (Bates et al., 2014; Hansard Society, 2014) on the history of the institution has
concluded that the debate has grown more shallow and party political over time, characterised more
by theatrics than reasoned policy debate. The finding of this study – that increased access to plenary
time ameliorates partisanship – may be used to test whether recent moves to increase the supply of
plenary access have been successful.
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the opposition (Labour) asks six questions close to the beginning of the session, with
other questions following soon after. Government questions are granted to MPs of
the governing party, in lieu of special privilege to a leader (the prime minister cannot
question herself). These questions, as guaranteed plenary time to the governing party
are typically planned strategically to highlight government successes. The fourth type
of question is discretionary to the Speaker of the House of Commons. Traditionally,
this was the only means by which backbench MPs could access plenary time in the
chamber independently of parties.
2.3.2 Data
The data on randomised questions at PMQs were gathered from two sources. The
content of questions was sourced from the record for applications to speak at PMQs,
which was graciously provided by the Speaker’s Office of the House of Commons. The
unit of analysis is the party, observed across 33 editions of PMQs. The data granted
by the Speaker’s Office give information on the applicants to 33 editions of PMQs
– from June 2015 to May 2016. This data lists the names of MPs entered into the
ballot, and gives the names of the 15 successful applicants. The record of speeches
was taken from Hansard, the official record of the Houses of Parliament. The textual
record of Prime Minister’s Questions is available on the parliament.uk website.
2.3.3 Dependent Variable: Partisan Questions
Methods for the scaling of political documents are now common in political science
and a variety of approaches exist for automated classification and scaling of political
texts (Friedman et al., 2001; Laver et al., 2003; Slapin and Proksch, 2008; Grimmer
and Stewart, 2013). However, human coding of political texts, where feasible, remains
a desirable means of document classification. In total, I code 495 questions from 33
editions of PMQs for partisanship. I then take the proportion of partisan questions
for each party at each edition of PMQs to measure partisanship at the party level.
To classify questions as partisan versus non-partisan, I code a question that
attacks the conduct of an opposing party or an opposing party’s leadership as one
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Table 2.1: Partisan and Non-Partisan Questions
Partisan Questions
Patrick Grady (SNP, 23rd March 2016): “Academics, civil society and the
Scottish Government have all condemned the Government’s anti-lobbying
clause . . . How can the Prime Minister promote transparency, democracy
and freedom of speech overseas when that clause is clamping down on those
principles here in the UK?”
Bill Esterson (Labour, 2nd March 2016): “. . . before the election, the
Prime Minister said that he had no plans to change Sunday trading laws.
When did he change his mind, or was it always his plan to scrap this great
British compromise as soon as the election was safely out of the way?”
Robert Jenrick (Conservative, 25th November 2015): “Three thousand
jobs in Newark were lost under Labour. This month, we celebrate the
creation of the 10,000th new job in Newark since 2010. Does the Prime
Minister agree that . . . Newark leads the way to a strong economy . . .
and lower welfare?”
Non-Partisan Questions
Martyn Day (SNP, 21st October 2015): “Will the Prime Minister tell the
House what plans are in place to ensure that the interests of all devolved
nations are taken into account in his forthcoming letter to the European
President, Donald Tusk, on EU reforms? What plans are in place to ensure
that the devolved nations are represented in renegotiation discussions before
the EU summit in December?”
Kate Hollern (Labour, 16th September 2015): “My constituent Enola
Halleron-Clarke, who is 11 years old, suffers from Morquio syndrome . . .
Enola would like to be able to use the drug Vimizim to help alleviate her
condition . . . Will the Prime Minister do all he can to encourage NICE
[National Institute for Health and Care Excellence] to come to a speedy
decision for Enola and people like her?”
Jesse Norman (Conservative, 13th April 2016): “Will and Carol Davies
and many other farmers in south Herefordshire are still awaiting their
2015 payments from the Rural Payments Agency . . . It is causing great
personal and financial distress . . . Will the Prime Minister agree to meet
farmers to discuss the issue and press the RPA to make these payments
by the end of this month . . . ?”
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(partisan = 1), and zero otherwise. Table 2.1 provides an illustrative example of
typical classifications. Under ‘Partisan Questions’, I give one example of a partisan
question from a MP of each party included in the analysis. For Labour and the SNP,
partisan questions are directed at the Prime Minister and attack the policy of the
Conservative Party. For Conservative MPs, a partisan question is typically directed at
Labour, the largest opposition party. Robert Jenrick’s question attacks the policies of
the previous (Labour) government, while supporting the policies of his own governing
Conservative Party. Non-Partisan questions may take a variety of forms. As long as
they do not explicitly oppose the policies of rival parties, then they are classified as
non-partisan.
2.3.4 Independent Variable: Random Access to the Floor
For each party, I measure the severity of a bottleneck in access to the floor by counting
the number of questions granted relative to the number of applications made to the
ballot. More precisely, I measure difference between the expectation of plenary time
relative to demand and the amount of time allocated in practice.
MPs tend to apply for PMQs out of habit; application rates are typically higher
among men, new MPs, and MPs with small majorities. For backbenchers, the expected
success rate-to-application for PMQs is around 5%. The number of questions allocated
to each party may vary theoretically from 0-15. Fifteen is the total number of questions
allocated by random ballot. The number of questions is allocated randomly, but the
number of questions received by each party is determined by the number of applications
made by its members relative to the overall number of applications from the House.
Qi − E[Q] represents the difference between the number of questions granted to a
party, minus the number they would have expected given their applications and
overall demand, and therefore captures the random variation in plenary access given
through the ballot.
I also use simpler measures of plenary access: N. of Q’s is the number of questions
allocated to a party in an edition of PMQs, while Success Rate is the ratio of successful
to non-successful applications to the ballot.
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The Validity of Treatment Conditions
For the allocation of questions to be seen as a true exogenous treatment, we must verify
the extent to which the ballot truly randomises applicants by party. I provide four
assurances of this. First, I show that parties are sufficiently able to react according
to treatment conditions. Second, Parliament claims that the process is random (UK
Parliament, 2018). I provide a simple verification of this claim using expected values
and a reasonable assumption of uncertainty to show that confidence intervals of the
mean deviation from the expected value bracket zero. Third, I account for variation
to the level of demand for questions at PMQs. Fourth, I argue that variations in the
type of demand for questions should not bias statistical results.
First, a crucial condition for valid treatment is that the content of questions is
not decided upon before questions are allocated. If this condition is not met then
the treatment is irrelevant because parties cannot adapt their questions to reflect
treatment conditions. Crucially, all that is required for entry into the ballot is the
name of the MP. Parties then have one week from the publication of ballot results to
Prime Minister’s Questions to coordinate their line of questioning. This ensures that,
once the ballot results are published (one week before PMQs), MPs and parties can
coordinate their questions given the treatment condition.
Second, I test the claim that the ballot for PMQs is randomly assigned. Figure 2.1
shows the distribution of question allocation by party in PMQs between 2015-2016.
On the y-axis, each point represents the difference between the allocation of questions
for a party in a single PMQs and the number of questions the party could have
expected to be granted given their share of applications in the ballot. The horizontal
line set to zero represents a scenario in which a party receives exactly the number
of questions they ought to have received. In simple arithmetic terms, if a party’s
members make 100 applications, and there are 300 applications overall, it should
expect to receive one third of the available plenary time (five questions). Deviations
from the zero line therefore represent how well parties do in the plenary lottery.
Above the line, the party does better than expected; below the line, worse. Over the
course of several iterations, the allocation for each party is distributed around zero,
16


















































































the line of expectation. Note that the distributions for each party differ significantly
in shape, according to the number of applications they make. For smaller parties, the
typical expectation for the ballot is close to 0, explaining the clustering just below
the expectation mark. Occasionally, an application from a smaller party is granted,
explaining the smaller clusters just under 1, showing that the smaller party received
almost one more question than they should have expected.
A confidence interval for the mean deviation for each party is drawn (samples: 1000,
confidence intervals: 95%), and is displayed in bars across the zero line. Bootstrapped
confidence intervals are presented because the non-normality assumption suits the data,
though results are not substantively changed using normally distributed confidence
intervals. If a 95% confidence interval for the mean includes zero, then the distribution
of questions is considered ‘random’ for each party. While this type of statistical test
cannot prove beyond doubt the absence of bias (Coronel-Brizio et al., 2008), it shows
that under reasonable tolerances for uncertainty the ballot does not systematically
advantage or disadvantage any party.
Third, another condition of valid treatment is that the element of ‘luck’, or the
success rate of parties, is independent of external fluctuations in demand for plenary
time. If high external demand is correlated with a low success rate for applications,
then it is plausible that the source of partisanship is not due simply to plenary
allocation, but to some external political event which could be driving anger at
the government or the prime minister. That is, if our measure ignored variation in
demand for questions at PMQs, then the measurement of question allocation would
not be randomly assigned.
I account for this problem by accounting for the demand for questions from each
party at each ballot for PMQs (see Figure 2.2). By measuring the difference between
the expected number of questions given demand and the number of questions granted
by ballot, this study finds a reliable measurement of random treatment assignment.
Fourth, one might argue that the type of demand (cf. the magnitude of demand)
for questions at PMQs may also present a problem for analysis. For example, if new
legislation were to emerge that infringed upon the rights of a given minority, we might
expect an unrepresentative rise in demand for questions from that minority. Such
18
events are exogenous to ballot allocation, however, and should add uncertainty but not
bias to the statistical analysis. Due to the low individual success rate of application
(5%), in order to make PMQs a reliable avenue to voice group grievances, there has
to be significant collective action among individuals. The more likely strategy would
be for an aggrieved group would be to pass on the line of questioning to their party
leaders, who may then choose either to take the cause for themselves or delegate to a
backbencher.

















































































































































































The results for the natural experiment are obtained using ordinary least squares
regression. Models 1-4 use the Qi − E[Q] version of the independent variable. Model
1 tests a pooled model including the Conservatives, the Labour Party, and the SNP.
Model 2 tests for just Labour and the Conservatives. The reason for this is that
results for the SNP could be biased. As mentioned above, smaller parties are often
unsuccessful in their applications to PMQs. The only two parties in the sample that
are always granted at least one question are Labour and the Conservatives. The SNP
were allocated zero questions in 7 out of 33 occasions. Since it is not possible to
know SNP partisanship when question allocation is zero, the missing values could
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Table 2.2: OLS Regression
Proportion of Partisan Questions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Qi − E[Q] −0.057∗∗∗ −0.042∗∗ −0.044∗∗∗ −0.026∗∗









Constant 0.446∗∗∗ 0.401∗∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗ 0.177∗∗∗ 0.756∗∗∗ 0.665∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.035) (0.044) (0.031) (0.063) (0.077)
N 92 66 92 66 92 92
R-squared 0.101 0.086 0.448 0.645 0.271 0.105
Notes: ∗∗∗p < .01; ∗∗p < .05; ∗p < .1. Model 1 shows a simple model with the
treatment as the number of questions allocated minus expected number of questions
given demand. Model 2 includes only Labour and Conservatives. Model 3 includes
party intercepts (Conservative Party as baseline). Model 4 also includes party
intercepts but excludes the SNP. Model 5 tests a simpler specification of treatment
with the number of questions allocated to each party. Model 6 tests the effect of
success rate for each party at each edition of PMQs.
bias estimation. As we can see, despite an attenuation in the effect, the independent
variable remains statistically reliable.
Model 3 includes dummy indicators for the political parties to ensure that within-
party variation is captured. Model 4 includes a dummy for the Labour Party and
excludes the SNP. In all four models, there are significant treatment effects, showing
an inverse relationship between access to the floor and partisanship. Models 5 and 6
test the alternate formulations of the access to the plenary session in fully pooled
models, showing similar effects on the proportion of partisan questions.
Figure 2.3 gives a graphical representation of the natural experiment, showing
that the relationship holds in each party [above], and when pooled together [below].
Here, we see the markedly different baseline levels of partisanship between parties.
The governing Conservative Party recorded a 17% average percentage of partisan
questions asked, while Labour were 63% partisan and the SNP 54% partisan. The
reason for relative lack of aggression from the Conservative Party reflects their
position as the governing party. Their role in PMQs, whilst no less party political
20
Figure 2.3: Association between access to the floor and partisan questioning for






















































































































































































than the opposition parties, is defensive rather than offensive. Since questions from
Conservative backbenchers are also directed to the PM, it is more likely that questions
are used to praise the policies of the government than to acknowledge the presence of
minority parties. Nevertheless, in all three parties we observe a clear reduction in the
proportion of partisan questions as the access to the plenary increases.
2.5 Conclusions
This chapter has shown that partisanship in House of Commons debates is dependent
upon plenary access as well as political ideology. Backbenchers are responsive to
plenary time because they have two choices: to ask a question of political interest to
them (cultivating a personal vote), or to toe the party line. The increase in plenary
time allows more backbenchers to feel comfortable voicing their own views without
feeling that they could have done better by explicitly advocating a partisan stance.
Furthermore, this chapter adapts the theory of the plenary bottleneck to show that
parties in PMQs respond to time scarcity by focusing their questions along partisan
lines.
These findings have implications for the study of legislative organisation, and
for the House of Commons itself. Firstly, whilst there are arguments in favour of
aggressive ‘Question Time’ formats in increasing the level of public engagement with
politics (Hetherington, 2001; Salmond, 2014), the evidence increasingly shows that
raucous and disrespectful behaviour is off-putting to a majority of voters (Bates
et al., 2014; Hansard Society, 2014). Taking measures to curb excessive partisanship
through increasing the supply of high-value debating time may help to broaden the
parameters of PMQs debate, and give a more representative impression of political
debate in the House of Commons in general. Accordingly, this study supports recent
efforts made to extend the running time of PMQs beyond 30 minutes.
Secondly, this chapter adds a new perspective on the importance of time scarcity in
determining legislative behaviour. Previous studies show that parties in the majority
tend to restrict minority party rights as a response to time scarcity (Binder, 1996;
Cox, 2006; Eggers and Spirling, 2014). Here, short-term variations in party-level
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access to the floor show that parties also react to time scarcity by influencing the
behaviour of their own party, as well as the behaviour of other parties. Thirdly, this
study adds to the continuing expansion of natural experiments in legislative politics
(Grofman et al., 1995; Grofman et al., 1995; Pettersson-Lidbom, 2012; Loewen et al.,
2014; Fukumoto and Matsuo, 2015; Horiuchi and John, 2016).
Further study might explore links between partisanship, plenary access and gender
to further develop study of the mechanisms causing the gendered disparity in legislative
speechmaking (Ba¨ck et al., 2014). At present, women are significantly less likely to
apply to speak at PMQs than are men. Efforts to reduce excessive partisanship in
the House of Commons may have the potential secondary benefit of improving gender
balance in applications to PMQs. Other studies might also explore the link between
speech at high-value and high-exposure debates like PMQs with individual electoral
outcomes. Legislative research shows that representatives often take the opportunity
to communicate their actions to their constituents (Grimmer, 2013; Slapin et al.,
2018). The ballot for PMQs may provide an excellent means to test the relationship
between legislative performance and re-election for incumbents. Finally, this Chapter
provides the basis on which to study the link between plenary access, partisanship
and other forms of parliamentary behaviour. It identifies and applies a source of
exogenous variation in parliamentary debate which may also be available across other






Strategic Party Disloyalty in
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During David Cameron’s first term as Conservative Prime Minister, Philip Hollobone
— a socially conservative member of the Tory rightwing — was the most rebellious
MP in the House of Commons. He voted against his own party leadership in 19.9%
of votes, a remarkable figure in Westminster where party cohesion is typically very
high. He rebelled despite the fact that the vast majority of the government’s agenda
moved policies in his preferred ideological direction. He was even willing to rebel
against his party on votes containing core conservative principles, saying that they
did not go far enough. In 2013, he went so far as to vote against the Queen’s Speech
— the annual statement of the government’s policy agenda. It was the first rebellion
by government MP’s against their own agenda since 1946. Hollobone, along with
three other Conservative MPs, instead put forward an “Alternative Queen’s Speech”
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outlining policies such as bringing back the death penalty, privatizing the BBC, and
banning the Burka.1
Hollobone’s own remarks suggest that he uses such votes to connect with his
constituents, signalling to them his independent spirit and ideological purity, saying to
the BBC that he rebels because his role is to “represent constituents in Westminster,
it’s not to represent Westminster in the constituency.”2 However, despite such a
public commitment to independence in voting, in the previous parliamentary term,
when the Conservatives were in opposition facing a Labour government, he rebelled
against his own party leadership almost five times less, just 4.3% of the time. Why
would the same MP behave so differently in these two settings?
We argue that his change in voting behaviour when in government compared with
opposition highlights features of Westminster politics that the theoretical and empirical
literature on postwar parties and parliamentary democracy has largely overlooked,
namely the link between government agenda control, ideology, and backbencher
rebellion. We demonstrate that backbencher rebellions are much more likely to occur
among ideologically extreme MPs when their party is in government. The Hollobone
vignette reflects a broader pattern: governing parties experience higher levels of
rebellion than opposition parties because the exact same ideological extremists rebel
more frequently when their party controls government, while moderates’ rebellious
behaviour remains largely unaffected by changes in government control. This result is
surprising given that most of the theoretical literature on party unity in parliamentary
systems focuses on government rather than opposition unity (e.g. Diermeier and
Feddersen, 1998; Huber, 1996). Moreover, because we look at within individual
changes, these patterns cannot be accounted for by the more mundane explanation
that parties’ delegations tend to be larger and more ideologically diverse when in
government than in opposition.
We present a theory of rebellion in Westminster parliamentary systems that links
government agenda control, ideology, and constituency representation. Because the
government has control over the legislative agenda, government party ideologues are
1Robert Watts, “Conservative MPs launch attempt to bring back death penalty, privatise the
BBC and ban burka” The Telegraph 20 June, 2013.
2See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-23958650. Last accessed 13 April, 2017.
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able to rebel on policy grounds, allowing them to represent the interests of certain
segments of their constituency without appearing to support the policy platform of
the opposition. Opposition ideologues, on the contrary, find it difficult to vote against
their party without appearing to support the policy prerogatives of the government.
They are less able to use rebellion as a tool to connect with constituents. To test
our theory, we draw on an extensive new database of rebellion on divisions (roll
call votes) and related debates in the House of Commons. We link the likelihood
of rebellion to ideology and government status, with ideology measured using the
content of parliamentary debates surrounding welfare politics using Wordscores (Laver
et al., 2003). We demonstrate that ideologically extreme MPs rebel more frequently,
especially when in government, and are more likely to pair their rebellion with
participation in debate, thus emphasizing their position.
3.1 Voting in the Westminster Systems
Any model of voting and rebellion in Westminster must account for two empirical
regularities: very high levels of party unity and a government vs. opposition divide
(Baughman, 2004; Kam, 2009; Spirling and Quinn, 2010; Dewan and Spirling, 2011).
Indeed, partisan politics dominates so much of the decision-making calculus of MPs
that ideological voting is, at best, a secondary motivation (Hix and Noury, 2016).
Nevertheless, we see historical variation in parties’ average levels of unity (Eggers
and Spirling, 2016), variation in individuals’ propensity to rebel (Gaines and Garrett,
1993), and that British voters value the dyadic link between themselves and their
representatives (Bertelli and Dolan, 2009; Bowler, 2010; Cain et al., 1987; Vivyan and
Wagner, 2012), including a representative’s independence from the party (Campbell
et al., 2016; Vivyan and Wagner, 2015). Nevertheless, the relative rarity of individual
defections from party line voting in the UK and elsewhere has resulted in literature
that either a) focuses on explanations for aggregate levels of party unity (e.g. Carey,
2007; Sieberer, 2006), or b) has relied on issue-specific explanations for defections
from the party line (Schonhardt-Bailey, 2003; Berrington and Hague, 1998; Cowley
and Norton, 1999; Lynch and Whitaker, 2013; Heppell, 2013). Less research offers
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general theories of individual-level rebellion (but see Kam, 2009). We draw theoretical
insights from literature focusing on both aggregate and individual levels of analysis.
Theoretical literature on aggregate-level party unity has examined how institu-
tions and government agenda control induce discipline among governing parties (e.g.
Diermeier and Feddersen, 1998; Heller, 2001; Huber, 1996). The need to pass a policy
agenda and the requirement that government have the confidence of parliament leads
governing parties to demand loyalty from their backbenchers. Indeed, the literature on
British political development highlights the relationship between government agenda
control and party loyalty (Cox, 1987). Beyond the UK, theoretical work suggests
that governments can control the agenda to avoid legislative defeat (if not disunity)
(Cox and McCubbins, 2005; Tsebelis, 2002).3 Theoretical scholars have paid less
attention to conditions that might foster high levels of unity among the opposition,
although Dewan and Spirling (2011) offer a model in which opposition parties can
achieve more favorable policy outcomes by committing their MPs to vote en bloc. If
the opposition can remain unified, the government must compromise with its own
potential rebels rather than with those from the opposition.4 Others suggest that
opposition parties may be able to avoid taking controversial stances on divisive issues
in ways that governing parties cannot, leading the opposition to show higher levels of
cohesion (Sieberer, 2006).
Literature focused on rebellion asks a slightly different, albeit related, question;
namely, conditional on some existing level of dissent, which MPs (or groups of MPs)
are most likely to publicly rebel from the party line. In contrast to aggregate-level
studies of party unity, this literature tends not to consider government agenda control
as a explanation for rebellion. Instead, it focuses on an MP’s ideology, likelihood
of promotion up the party ranks, and length of tenure in parliament (Kam, 2009).
Virtually all empirical literature on rebellion in Westminster, both quantitative
and qualitative, examines rebellion (often conceived of as a group activity) on the
government back benches (e.g. Benedetto and Hix, 2007; Cowley and Norton, 1999;
3There is an important distinction between the ability of government to use agenda control to
pass policy and to reign in rebels. If a governing party controls enough seats, it is likely able and
willing to bring a bill up for a vote (and pass it) in the face of some internal opposition.
4We discuss the relationship between our model and theirs in the next section.
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Gaines and Garrett, 1993; Garner and Letki, 2005). Rebellion among opposition
backbenchers, or lack thereof, receives little attention.5 Given the political and policy
consequences of government backbencher rebellion, the empirical focus on governing
parties is not surprising. However, because the existing literature has not directly
compared individual-level MP behaviour while in the opposition to their behaviour
while in the government, we argue that researchers do not know the full extent of
the empirical puzzle and have yet to fully explore the impact of government agenda
setting on rebellion.
We provide a general theory of individual defections from party votes in which
electoral incentives drive MP behaviour. We are certainly not the first to pursue
such an effort (see, among others Kam, 2009; Carey, 2008). Prior efforts focus
on questions of individual agency amid refusals of ministerial positions (Benedetto
and Hix, 2007; Kam et al., 2010; Eggers and Spirling, 2016; Piper, 1991; Tavits,
2009), individual ideology (Kam, 2001), general socialization towards acquiescence
to party leaders’ preferences (Crowe, 1986), strategic opposition as a function of a
commitment mechanism (Dewan and Spirling, 2011), and constituent preferences
on salient parliamentary issues (Schaufele, 2014; Bowler, 2010; Pattie et al., 1994;
Johnston et al., 2002; Longley, 1998; Vivyan and Wagner, 2012). In contrast, we
combine theorizing on government agenda control — key to studies of aggregate-level
behaviour — with explanations found in the individual-level literature to build a
new theory. We consider how governing parties’ commitment (and ability) to change
policy interacts with individual ideology to generate electoral incentives for MPs to
craft an image of independence through rebellion. In doing so, we contribute to the
growing literature on representation and electoral signalling through legislative votes
and speech (Ba¨ck et al., 2014; Herzog and Benoit, 2015; Proksch and Slapin, 2012).
5Kam (2001, 2009) looks at rebellion in both government and opposition parties, but he does
not explicitly examine the effect of government agenda control on rebellion.
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3.2 Ideology and Grandstanding in the House of
Commons: A Theory
Our theory of rebellion in Parliament hinges on a theory of elections and represen-
tation. As many before us, we view MPs as agents of two (potentially) competing
principals — their party and their voters. Electoral incentives affect the degree to
which MPs are beholden to these principals (Carey, 2007; Hix, 2004). On the one
hand, the Westminster system, coupling single member district plurality elections
with parliamentary democracy, empowers parties. Parties exercise significant control
over candidate selection and voters typically consider a vote for a particular MP
as a vote for that MP’s party. Nevertheless, an MP’s name features prominently
on the ballot, and MPs have a strong incentive to engage in activities that boost
their name recognition among voters (Cain et al., 1987). As voters value some
degree of independence among their MPs (Campbell et al., 2016; Vivyan and Wagner,
2015), rebellion is clearly one mechanism for generating individual recognition (Kam,
2009, pp. 113–117). As Kam points out, “British MPs appear to use dissent and
constituency service as complementary vote-winning strategies” (Kam, 2009, p. 103).
The question remains, though, under what conditions is rebellion from the party
an effective strategy? We argue that the answer relates to conditions under which
MPs are best able to use their dissent as a mechanism to communicate policy stances
to voters for electoral gain. In short, government backbenchers, and particularly
those who stake out more extreme ideological positions, are better positioned to turn
dissent into an asset than opposition backbenchers and moderates.
Dissent is not a strategy that MPs can employ with too much regularity.6 There
are real costs associated with dissent for both the party and the MP. For the party,
mass dissent is embarrassing. It can water down the party’s message, potentially
costing it votes at election time (Kam, 2009, Chapter 6). For governing parties, mass
6Throughout this section, we treat the decision to rebel as though it belongs solely to the MP.
In some instances, party leaders could coordinate rebellious acts. They, too, may benefit when their
backbenchers connect with constituents. Nevertheless, we believe that on the whole party leaders
attempt to avoid rebellion. For the purposes of our theory and empirical results, it makes little
difference if rebellion is solely at the discretion of the MP or coordinated more centrally by the party.
The same MP-level incentives apply and the empirical predictions would be identical.
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dissent can jeopardize the party’s legislative program, and even potentially lead a
government to collapse. For the dissenting MP, at the extreme the party leadership
could remove the whip, kicking the MP out of the parliamentary party, or revoke
support at election time. But well before taking these drastic measures, the party
could sanction the MP by discounting the MP’s policy priorities or overlooking the
MP when considering promotions within the party hierarchy. The costs of these
sanctions may vary across MPs. The sanctions are least costly to those electorally
secure MPs less likely to move up the ministerial ranks who have created an electoral
profile for themselves somewhat distinct from the party, thus insulating them from
party punishment mechanisms. MPs must carefully weigh the benefits of dissent
against the costs, and only rebel when they are able to fully exploit the electoral
advantages of taking a stand that contradicts their party’s main message.
A backbencher can benefit from rebellion in two different ways, and they are
not mutually exclusive. The first is ideologically (or spatially), and the second is
through the opportunity to communicate a policy stance to voters. We describe the
ideological motivations first. Following a spatial logic, a MP may oppose a bill on
ideological grounds if she prefers the legislative status quo to the policy proposed in
the bill. Standard Downsian spatial voting suggests that for any reasonable set of
status quo locations, only MPs holding moderate positions on a given policy would
vote against the majority of their party (Downs, 1957). Suppose that a Conservative
government bill is the subject of a division in parliament. This bill will likely to move
policy in a conservative direction relative to the status quo. Very few members of the
opposition Labour party (or other leftwing opposition parties) have an ideological
incentive to support a proposal that moves policy away from the preferred position of
their party. The few members of the opposition who might defect would be moderate
MPs, sufficiently conservative to side with the government on occasion. Likewise,
one could imagine that moderate Conservatives, who view their own government as
having pushed policy too far, might vote against their party on occasion, too. In
unidimensional, single issue voting, we would never expect ideological extremists to
defect when moderates do not. Within ideologically well-sorted parties, spatially
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motivated defections should be rare and come from the middle.7
The second way an MP could benefit from dissent is to use a rebellious vote
as an opportunity to highlight her preferred policy position and to distinguish her
stance from that of the party. She could seek to garner electoral support from an
ideologically driven subset of the electorate by vocally standing up against a policy
that has a reasonable chance of becoming law but that this particular ideological
constituency opposes. The MP and the constituency may both prefer the status
quo over the bill, and the MP may use rebellion to signal to voters her ideological
discontent in a legitimate attempt to block passage of the bill. But even if an MP
prefers the bill over the legislative status quo, she may rebel to signal that, in an
ideal world, she would have preferred a different policy. This strategy is particularly
effective when the bill has sufficient support to pass regardless of the actions taken
by the individual MP. For example, an MP could advocate for a policy that goes
substantially beyond the policy as stated in the bill, saying that although policy is
moving in the right direction, it does not go far enough. The actual act of crossing
the aisle on the division is important, as these rebellions receive significant press
coverage.8
Thus, regardless of an MP’s spatial utility for a bill, rebellion can provide an
opportunity to signal a policy stance and connect with a subset of ideologically driven
voters at the expense of party unity. We argue, though, that MPs’ ability to benefit
from rebellion in this manner is conditional on their party being in government
and possessing control of the parliamentary agenda. The set of MPs who benefit
from voters perceiving them as distinct from their own party differs greatly for the
governing party and opposition. Rebellion when in the opposition may look like
support for the government and its policy agenda. Opposition moderates, who might
7Note that when politics is multidimensional, it is perfectly plausible for an MP who generally
holds extreme positions to possess moderate positions on specific issues. Thus, we could see
individuals classified as extremists on occasion defecting for ideological reasons following a spatial
logic. Nevertheless, we know from empirical literature that spatial voting models do a poor job
of classifying votes in Westminster (Spirling and McLean, 2006) and rebels (or at least those in
government) are generally extremists (Benedetto and Hix, 2007).
8Here we assume that an ideologically driven electorate cares more about the policy position the
MP advocates for than the actual location of the policy outcome. In short, voters are motivated by
ideology, but not spatial politics. One interpretation could be that voters are less sophisticated that
politicians and are less likely to understand the position of the status quo policy. An alternative
interpretation is that ideologically motivated constituents derive utility from having their views
voiced, regardless of policy outcome.
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on occasion support government policies, would prefer to see their own party make
policy change and get credit for it. Indeed, Dewan and Spirling (2011) offer a spatial
logic to suggest that even moderate opposition members can be better off by binding
themselves to their party and voting strategically against the government. Among
more ideologically extreme opposition MPs, it would be very difficult to connect
with ideologically driven constituencies within their party by offering support to a
government that usually moves policy in the wrong direction.
Government MPs, in contrast, are better able to argue that their government is
generally doing the “right” thing, but happens to have gotten it “wrong” on this
particular issue. A government backbencher wishing to oppose her own government
could do so under two different conditions. First, the backbencher may support the bill,
but feel that it does not go far enough. She wishes to say that the government should
be doing more, without actually defeating the bill. Second, if a bill moves policy away
from from her ideal point (e.g. a Labour government passes cuts in unemployment
benefits), the MP may genuinely wish to defeat the measure. Both scenarios create
opportunities for government backbenchers to demonstrate independence from the
party and garner name recognition, but they have different policy implications and
risks.
In both instances, MPs who occupy the ideological fringes of the party — as
opposed to moderates — are most likely to rebel. In the first scenario, if an extremist
MP knows with a high degree of certainty that the bill will pass regardless of her
actions (moving policy in her direction), the MP may benefit by opposing her own
party saying policy change does not go far enough. Such rebellion is conditional
on the extremist’s ability to explain that her defection is not a preference for the
status quo, but instead a preference for even larger policy shifts. In other words,
ideologically extreme members of a governing party may use divisions as opportunities
to “grandstand” or cast a strategic vote against their own party to signal ideological
purity to voters, so long as they have a mechanism for defending that defection.
Floor debates offer a prime opportunity for MPs to explain their votes. Debates
provide a good conduit for MPs to explain ideological differences. Party leaders
generally lack formal mechanisms to prevent particular MPs from speaking, or to
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determine what they say. MPs often use their speeches to dissent from the party
line even when they vote with it, meaning that their speeches provide insight into
intra-party differences (Proksch and Slapin, 2015). If an MP wishes to speak in a
debate, the MP can register her desire to participate with the non-partisan Speaker
of the House. The parliamentary rules of procedure give the Speaker wide latitude to
control debate. Members stand to “catch the Speaker’s eye” when they wish to speak.
The Speaker’s primary concern is provide partisan balance, choosing speakers from
alternate sides of the aisle; not whether a speaker wishes to express a view at odds
with the party leadership. While MPs may not always be able to participate in debate
as they like — demand for speaking time may at times outstrip supply — if rebels
demand more speaking time in particular instances, they should also participate at
higher rates at these times.
In the second scenario, if a sufficient number of MPs genuinely oppose a policy,
making government defeat a real possibility, rebellion becomes a riskier strategy. The
costs for both the MP and the party are greater, but so is the possibility for the MP
to generate press for her position. The press pays more attention to votes when there
is a chance of government defeat. Here, a government backbencher may legitimately
prefer the status quo over the bill, but she has to determine whether any potential
spatial benefits and opportunities for grandstanding outweigh the costs imposed by
the party. Depending on the nature of the issue, some MPs may prefer the status quo
and use the spatial gain as an opportunity to grandstand, as well. But the benefits of
grandstanding would have to be large relative to the costs imposed by the party.
Lastly, we argue that the party is less able to impose costs on MPs who generally
hold extreme positions. Moderates tend to wish to climb the party ladder and they
have their eyes on ministerial positions (Benedetto and Hix, 2007; Kam et al., 2010).
They are also less likely to represent easily identifiable ideological groups. Extremists
are likely better able to connect to ideological constituencies within the party, and
any punishment the party metes out may even help foster the view of the MP as a
maverick willing to show independence from the party.
The incorporation of utility from grandstanding and strategic party disloyalty
among governing party members implies a different set of hypotheses than a simple
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spatially-motivated account of defection. Our account of strategic party disloyalty
suggests that: 1) the same MPs are more likely to rebel when their party is in
government than when in opposition, 2) among governing party members, ideological
extremists are the most likely to defect, and 3) those ideologically extreme governing
party MPs are likely to telegraph their defection by speaking in parliamentary debate
when they do so. Accordingly, differences in the distributions of party dissent and
the prevalence of parliamentary speech paired with dissent among MPs when in
government and opposition offer a critical test of our theory. We lay out the following
hypotheses based on our theory.
Hypothesis 1: The probability of dissent increases when an MP’s party
is in government.
Hypothesis 2: The probability of dissent increases among more ideolog-
ically extreme governing party MPs.
Hypothesis 3: The probability of a parliamentary speech paired with
a dissent increases among more ideologically extreme governing party MPs.
Before proceeding to test our theoretical argument using data on dissent and
speech in the House of Commons, we briefly address the two alternative models.
The first is that we find less rebellion within parties when in the opposition simply
because they are smaller and more cohesive than when in government. This argument
assumes that those members most likely to rebel when in government were also
the most electorally vulnerable. The loss of electorally vulnerable members’ seats
caused the party to move from government to opposition. The remaining MPs are
more ideologically cohesive. In contrast, the governing party gained seats by adding
marginal members who are more likely to dissent. We rule out this argument by
looking at within-MP changes in rebellion across time. In other words, we ask whether
the exact same members were more likely to rebel when in the government than the
opposition. We also examine whether more electorally secure or more vulnerable
members were likely to rebel and find no evidence of electoral vulnerability mattering
in a consistent manner.
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A second possible argument is the purely spatial logic put forward by Dewan and
Spirling (2011). They explicitly reject electoral signaling arguments such as ours as
a driver of opposition cohesion. Their basic argument is that, on an issue-by-issue
basis, moderates in the opposition are better off in a policy sense if they can bind
themselves to vote against the government. Thus, moderates in the government are
a more likely source of rebellion. Their model would predict that the identical MP
should be more loyal when in opposition than when in government. We view this
argument as plausible, but not necessarily contradictory to ours. It is entirely possible
that on an issue by issue basis some extremists are indeed “moderates”, or stake
out a position close to the opposition on a particular issue, and these are the issues
where we observe defection. However, if there were no electoral signalling story, we
would not expect any differences in debate activity. We would argue that if even if
the spatial story holds true, government MPs are still able to use issues to connect
with voters in a way that opposition members are not. Moreover, our theory can
explain rebellion in instances when their theory cannot — namely, we would predict
defection among government MPs when they truly take an extreme position and the
status quo is likely to move in their direction, as suggested by the Hollobone anecdote
in the introduction. A spatial model does not predict defection in these instances.
3.3 Data on Divisions, Defections, and Debates
To test our hypotheses, we compare individual MP behaviour on divisions and speeches
when their parties move from government to opposition. We take advantage of two
changes in government — the switch from the Conservative government of John
Major to the Labour government of Tony Blair in 1997, and the switch from Gordon
Brown’s Labour government to David Cameron’s Conservative/Liberal Democrat
government in 2010. Prior to Labour winning 1997 they had been in opposition for 18
years. When the Conservatives came to power in 2010, they had been in opposition
for 13 years. Because we are specifically interested in how individuals change their
behaviour as a result of the change in government, we only examine MPs from the
Labour and Conservative parties.
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Of course, the 2010–2015 government was a coalition of the Conservatives and
Liberal Democrats. We assume that the presence of the Liberal Democrats as the
junior coalition partner did not drastically affect the behaviour of the Conservative
party backbenchers. From the perspective of the spatial model, so long as the
coalition generally preferred policies to the right of the previous Labour government,
the presence of the Liberal Democrats should not change our expectations regarding
Conservative party backbencher behaviour. If anything, the presence of the moderate
Liberal Democrats in government makes the coalition period a particularly good
parliament in which to look for evidence in support of our theory. To the extent that
the Liberal Democrats moderated government proposals, we would expect extremist
Conservatives to have an increased incentive to rebel, emphasizing that the government
does not represent truly conservative interests.9
Our analysis below demonstrates that patterns of rebellion during the period
of coalition government look similar to those in the earlier periods. Moreover, the
number of divisions and overall percentage of rebels on those divisions look very much
the patterns we find in the earlier periods for both Labour and the Conservatives. A
slightly higher percentage of divisions experience 10 or more rebels but the numbers
are comparable to the previous period of Conservative government (5.52% compared
with 8.55%). The most notable difference in the coalition period is that the very
most rebellious Conservative MPs seem to have rebelled more. These results are
largely in line with initial analyses of the coalition government that find higher levels
of rebellion confined to a small number of rebels. These rebellions had little impact
on the passage of the government’s agenda or the overall style of government, making
the coalition largely business as usual (Yong, 2012).
Data on MPs’ rebellions from their parties on parliamentary divisions were
gathered from www.theyworkforyou.com for the 2005–2015 period. For the earlier
periond, 1992–2001, the data were parsed directly from Hansard XML files available
at www.hansard-archive.parliament.uk. We identify free votes (those that are
not subject to any whipping) and drop them from the analysis.10 Additionally, we
9We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out to us.
10While there is no definitive list of all free votes, a list of known free votes from 1997 to 2015
is available from the House of Commons Library at http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/
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gathered information on parliamentary debate participation for debates associated
with divisions. Thus, for every division, we are able to identify who rebelled against
their party (defined as voting against the party majority) and who gave a speech
during the debate associated with that division. Table 3.1 provides information on
the number of divisions per parliament and the number of rebellious acts we record.
Specifically, for both parties in each period we report rebellious acts as percentage
of the total number of votes cast (excluding free votes); the percentage of divisions
experiencing one or more rebels; the percentage of divisions experiencing greater
than 10 rebellions; the percentage of MPs who rebelled at least once; and number of
times the median and maximum MP (with respect to rebellion) rebelled. These data
(and all subsequent analyses) drop any MP who switched party during the period of
observation.11









No. of Divisions 1249 1245 1233 1204
% Rebellions
Labour 0.46 0.52 0.66 0.64
Conservative 0.50 0.59 0.66 0.54
% Divisions with => 1 Rebel
Labour 14.25 15.26 36.98 15.53
Conservative 22.02 10.12 15.25 36.71
% Divisions with => 10 Rebels
Labour 3.04 5.54 9.89 2.08
Conservative 5.52 0.80 2.19 8.55
% of MPs who Rebel
Labour 93.23 94.49 73.29 71.96
Conservative 86.75 96.62 88.52 83.87
No. Rebellions Median/Max MP
Labour 5/34 4/71 2/233 2/46
Conservative 2/67 3/28 3/41 2/217
The summary data are in line with previous studies of rebellion in the UK (e.g.
Kam, 2009). They demonstrate that while rebellion is rare — fewer than 1% of
recorded votes are rebellious — rebellious MPs and divisions experiencing rebellion
are common. Most MPs vote against the majority of their party least once over
the course of a parliamentary term, and a small number do so with some frequency.
ResearchBriefing/Summary/SN04793. For the earlier period, all votes with significant levels of
rebellion were checked to determine whether they may have been a free vote. Specifically, speeches
related to divisions were checked for mentions of a free vote as well as media sources. We thank
Raphael Heuwieser for help in identifying these votes and providing us with data.
11A list of party-switchers can be found in Appendix F.
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Additionally, the percentage of divisions experiencing at least one rebellious vote is
reasonably high.
Others have suggested that voting patterns may differ depending on the nature of
the division, when it occurs within the parliamentary agenda (Bra¨uninger et al., 2016;
Coman, 2012), and whether a vote is recorded (Hug, 2010).12 Using the extensive
division titles provided by www.theyworkforyou.com for the later period of our study
(2005–2015) we identify where and when in the parliamentary agenda these divisions
occur.13 The vast majority of divisions are votes on clauses and amendments to bills
following the second reading stage, once the bill has passed to committee. A much
smaller number occur at the time of a bill’s second or third readings, either in an
attempt to decline a reading, to make an amendment to the motion to hold a reading,
or on the reading, itself. Lastly, divisions on opposition days — days on which the
opposition controls the parliamentary agenda — are quite common. In line with our
theory, though, rebellion on these divisions is very rare.
3.4 Analyses of Rebellion
We now proceed to our statistical models of rebellion. We employ fractional logit
models with MP-level random effects. Our dependent variable is a proportion — the
number of times an MP rebelled from her party over the total number of divisions
within a parliamentary term —, making OLS is an inappropriate modelling strategy.14
An individual MP’s level of rebellion is properly viewed as a series of binomial trials
coded one if a legislator rebels against her party on a division and zero otherwise.
Fractional logit models take proportions in which the numerator and denominator
are known and expands them out into sets of zeros and ones. For example, we
12Recent advances in the literature on roll call votes have focussed on analysing and accounting
for selection effects (Carrubba et al., 2008; Hug, 2010; Rosas et al., 2015). We wholeheartedly agree
that accounting for selection of votes is essential when attempting to measure latent characteristics
of parties (e.g. cohesion and ideology) or their members (e.g. ideology and latent propensity to
rebel) from votes. However, our goal is to understand the public act of rebellion, when it is more
likely to occur, who is likely to engage in it, and why. In other words, we are interested in rebellion
conditional on the set of votes that the political system provides us with. These votes may not
provide unbiased data to use when estimating an MP’s latent propensity to rebel, but they do
capture who rebels when given the opportunity.
13The division headings for the earlier period are not as extensive and do not allow us to identify
the nature of the division. More information is available in Appendix C.
14Information on the modelling strategy can be found in Appendix G.
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may observe 100 instances of an MP opposing his or her party out of 1000 votes.
This implies there are 100 ones and 900 zeroes in a binary coding of that MP’s
opposition to her party. From this setup a standard logistic regression emerges to
predict the probability of an outcome, given some attributes of the groups (in this
case, legislators), but with no information about the trials (in this case, divisions)
themselves. We estimate separate models for two periods, 1992–2001 and 2005–2015,
each consisting of two parliamentary terms. MPs who serve in both terms during
a period appear in the data twice, while those who serve in only one term appear
only for the term they serve. By incorporating MP varying intercepts, we remove
the between-unit variance in rebellion and concentrate on the within-unit variance,
meaning we examine within-MP change.
We are first and foremost interested in whether MPs tend to rebel relatively
more when their party is in government or in opposition, and whether some MPs are
more affected by this shift than others. As we hypothesize above, we expect more
ideologically extreme members to be more affected by a change in government control.
Measuring MP-level ideological extremity over time in the House of Commons in very
difficult. The most common approach to date has been to use measures obtained
from candidate surveys (Benedetto and Hix, 2007; Kam, 2009; Kam et al., 2010).
We do not take this approach for two reasons: first, response rates for these surveys
are rather low, meaning scholars either rely heavily on multiple imputation methods
for missing data or only examine a small subset of MPs; and second, using these
data require researchers to match anonymous survey responses to individual MP
parliamentary records by merging on uniquely identifying constituency level data.
Data for later periods do not allow for such merging. Other approaches using Early
Day Motions are harder to implement and only available for limited time periods
(Kellermann, 2012).
Instead, we take three different approaches. First, previous research has demon-
strated that ideologically extreme members are most likely rebel, while moderates are
much less likely to do so (Benedetto and Hix, 2007; Cowley and Norton, 1999; Kam,
2009). Indeed, rebellious extremists are precisely the reason why classical techniques
for scaling roll call votes do not provide measures of ideology in the UK (Spirling
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and McLean, 2006), and often rebelliousness is taken as an indication of extremism.
Thus, we first simply examine whether those MPs who rebel the most are more likely
to alter their behaviour when in government than when in opposition. This simple
measure allows us to preserve as much data as possible and allows us to understand
how government agenda-setting impacts rebellious behaviour amongst those MPs
with the highest propensity to rebel.
Of course, if this were the only analysis we provided we would be saying little
about the role of ideology. Thus, we examine two further measures of ideology. First,
some backbencher MPs within the House of Commons join ideological groups known
to take positions on the ideological extreme of the party. In the case of Labour, the
Socialist Campaign Group has represented the hard left wing of the party dating
back to 1982. Within the Conservatives, the hard right wing has been represented
by various groups over the years including the Conservative Monday Club15, the
Cornerstone Group representing traditional social conservatives and the “No Turning
Back Group” representing Thatcherite free marketeers. We create a dummy equaling
one for any MP that we have determined to have been associated with any of these
groups. A list of these MPs can be found in Appendix B.
Lastly, we estimate ideology based on upon speeches on welfare-related bills
using the Wordscores method (Laver et al., 2003) and we examine the effect of the
interaction between our ideology measure and government status on rebellion. We
provide a brief description of the Wordscores estimation below, along with a fuller
description and validity checks in Appendix A.16
The eight models in Table 3.2 offer initial evidence in favor of our theory. In
models 1–4, we regress overall MP rebelliousness on two dummy variables and their
interaction. Government takes on a value of one when an MP’s party is in government
and zero when in opposition. Most Rebellious takes on a value of one for the 25%
most rebellious MPs and zero, otherwise. The model controls for MPs’ electoral
15The party formally severed ties with the Monday Club in 2001 in response to its extreme views.
16Wordscores works well in this instance compared with unsupervised approaches such as Wordfish
(Slapin and Proksch, 2008), which less suited for capturing ideology from speeches (Proksch and
Slapin, 2010). Wordscores allows us to identify relevant reference texts to pin down the space.
Additionally, by focusing solely on debate related to welfare, we ensure that we capture an ideological

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































security by including their vote majority from the previous election, for holding a
leadership position, and for the length of time they have served in parliament.17
Although endogenous — we regress rebellion on rebellion — the first four models offer
a simple specification that allows us to demonstrate that those members who rebel
the most act very differently when in government and in opposition. The positive and
statistically significant effects of the interaction terms imply that, for both parties
in both time periods, the members who rebel the most are even more likely to rebel
when in government than in opposition. In models 5–8, we regress rebellion on our
group membership dummy and the interaction of this dummy with the Government
dummy. We find a positive coefficient on group membership which is statistically
significant in three of the four models, with the exception being the earlier period
for the Conservatives. On average, members belonging to these ideological groups
are more rebellious. More importantly, we find a positive and statistically significant
effect on the interaction term across all four models; MPs belonging to these extreme
groups rebel even more frequently when their party is in government than in the
opposition. We also find a strong and statistically significant effect for Tenure, with
longer-serving MPs rebelling more frequently. As expected, leaders are much less
likely to rebel, while there appears to be no clear cut pattern with respect to an MP’s
electoral majority.
To give our logistic regression results some substantive meaning, we plot the
probability of a rebellious vote by a party member belonging to an ideological group
as the member moves between government and opposition party status using the
results from models 5–8 in Table 3.2. These predicted probabilities appear in Figure
3.1.18 The predictions for Labour are lighter and those for Conservatives are darker.
Circles represent predictions for group members while squares are those for non-
members. The lines represent 95% confidence intervals. The figures show that MPs
17Both the Majority and Tenure variables are rescaled to help with model convergence. We
rescale Majority by dividing by 10,000. Tenure is calculated as the number of years that an MP
has served in the parliament at the midpoint of the time periods we investigate (1997 and 2010)
divided by the number years served by the longest serving MP at that time. Leadership is coded one
for any MP who was a member of Cabinet or Shadow Cabinet or Minister of State (or opposition
equivalent) throughout the entire parliament. The party leadership data are taken from Proksch
and Slapin (2015) for the earlier period and expanded to cover all years in our sample. We have also
run models dropping leaders and looking only at backbenchers and all results hold.
18The predicted probabilities are calculated for backbenchers with mean values on the Tenure












































































Figure 3.1: Probability of a Rebellious Vote in Government and Opposition by Group
Membership
who do not belong to ideologically extreme groups tend to rebel with relatively equal
frequency when in government and opposition. However, among MPs belonging to
ideological groups (the circles), dissent is much more frequent when in government
than in opposition. The rate of rebellion increases approximately 2.5 times.
Using data on the nature of divisions in the later period from Bra¨uninger et al.
(2016), we have rerun the 2005–2015 models keeping only divisions on items sponsored
by the governing party, excluding private member bills — in other words, items
the government wants to pass. All of our results hold in this subset of divisions
offering further evidence for our theory. We have examined whether any differences
exist in rebellious behaviour within the Labour party when the leadership shifted
from John Smith to Tony Blair and again when Tony Blair stepped down as Prime
Minister, allowing Gordon Brown to take over. We find no statistical differences in
the levels of rebel following these leadership changes. See Appendices D and E for
more information.
3.4.1 Wordscores Ideology
While illustrative of the pattern suggested by our theory, the results in Table 3.2
can be pushed further by explicitly looking at measures of ideology. To do so, we
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use Wordscores to estimate ideology from parliamentary speech. The estimates are
based on an original collection of every speech related to welfare in the House of
Commons from 1987–2007. The House of Commons is a good place to use speech
data to measure legislators’ policy positions because, as discussed above, British MPs
enjoy very substantial autonomy to speak as they choose.
We use speeches on welfare issues for both methodological and substantive reasons.
Methodologically, by restricting the estimation to a single issue area we avoid problems
that may arise when speeches from several different areas are combined. Research on
scaling speech has demonstrated that estimation of ideology from multidimensional
speech can be quite difficult (Lauderdale and Herzog, 2016). If the distribution of
MPs’ ideologies is multi-dimensional (for instance on economic versus social issues),
then some MPs could accidentally be scored as centrist simply because they take
extreme but opposite positions across dimensions. Likewise, with multiple topics,
there could be a danger of conflating genuine extremism (a tendency to speak in
extreme ways) with a tendency or requirement to talk a lot about topics that are
relatively extreme to begin with. The latter is a particular concern in a parliamentary
system like the UK, where some MPs are also ministers with formal requirements to
speak about their own issue area.
Substantively, the welfare state is a controversial and highly politically-charged
issue that very clearly divides British political parties in a traditional left-right space,
both between — and more importantly for our purposes — within each party. The
Labour party originally created, and then staunchly defended, traditional welfare
programs throughout most of its history. But under Tony Blair’s leadership, it
introduced significant welfare reforms that included cuts to major programs and the
introduction of means-testing and “welfare-to-work” initiatives (Rhodes, 2000; Clasen,
2005). Within the Labour party these reforms were hugely controversial and caused
major internal strife, including the back-bench rebellions of Tony Blair’s first term
as Prime Minister (1997-2001) (Cowley, 2002). Similarly, much of David Cameron’s
time as Prime Minister was taken up with far-reaching welfare reforms, which caused
splits within the Conservatives, between the coalition parties, and within Labour as it
struggled to articulate a coherent response. Finally, since Wordscores is a supervised
45
algorithm, the choice of training data is crucial in estimation. Because welfare reform
was such a charged issue throughout the period that we consider, it is easy to identify
ideologically extreme factions that anchor the estimated scale, as we discuss below.
The speeches include both regular debates and scheduled question times for
relevant ministries, including all questions to Ministers for Social Security, and a
subset of questions to Treasury ministers that cover welfare issues. They were divided
into two periods. The first runs from the 1987 election up to the death of John
Smith, Tony Blair’s predecessor as Labour leader, in June 1994, when Labour largely
remained a traditional social democratic party. The second runs from June 1994
up to June 2007, the era of “New Labour” under Tony Blair, when it embraced
welfare reform. Each MP is represented in one or both of the two periods by a single
document, consisting of all speeches they made about welfare in that time. MPs
appearing in both periods feature as two separate documents, although many only
feature in one period, depending on when they were in office or when they spoke on
welfare issues. It is necessary to split MPs in this way due to ideological change over
time amongst Labour MPs, who shifted substantially to the center under Blair. In
our study, the 1987-94 speeches are used to estimate ideological extremity for MPs in
the 1992–2001 period, and the 1994–2007 speeches are used to estimate extremity
for the later 2005–2015 period. This division of periods not only corresponds to
important changes within the Labour Party, but it also allows us to avoid issues of
endogeneity as the speeches we use to estimate ideology largely pre-date the periods
of rebellion we examine.
Finally, MPs whose total speeches about welfare comprised only a handful of
sentences were discarded, as these documents do not contain sufficient information to
estimate the MP’s position. Because of this, and because some MPs did not make
a single speech about welfare, we estimate positions for only a sample of all MPs
who held office over the period. Nonetheless many of the most prominent names are
included, both ministers and backbenchers, and there is very substantial ideological
diversity among the MPs. The appendix contains more information on those MPs
included.
Wordscores requires the identification of reference texts. Our reference documents
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were chosen based on membership in the ideological groups described earlier; they
were not selected by pre-examining the speeches. For Labour, the left-wing reference
document consists of all speeches made by members of the far-left “Socialist Campaign
Group” during the pre-Blair era, when the party as a whole was more left-wing. It
contains many famous figures from the Labour left, including Diane Abbott, Tony
Benn, Jeremy Corbyn and George Galloway. In total, 23 Socialist Campaign Group
MPs were included in the reference document. On the right, we used speeches made by
Secretaries of State in the later period who were responsible for the welfare state, all of
whom were close to Tony Blair, supported welfare reforms, and were clearly situated
on the right of the party (Alistair Darling, Andrew Smith, David Blunkett, Harriet
Harman and John Hutton). By definition, their rhetoric in parliament supported the
more centrist Blair administration.
For the Conservatives, the left-wing reference document consists of all MPs (in both
periods) who were members of the “Tory Reform Group”. This is a moderate faction
that has advocated for moving the Conservatives to the center, and is associated
with socially progressive, pro-European views. Its membership includes a number of
famous moderates, including Kenneth Clarke, Michael Heseltine and Douglas Hurd, as
well as MPs who defected to either Labour or the Liberal Democrats, including Alan
Howarth and Emma Nicholson. The right-wing reference document contains members
of the Thatcherite ‘No Turning Back’ group. As the name suggests, this group argues
for a continuation of Margaret Thatcher’s conservative economic policies, and includes
famous names from the right, including Iain Duncan-Smith, John Redwood and Liam
Fox.
Our Wordscores measures of ideological extremism display statistically significant,
albeit moderate, bivariate correlation with the number of rebellions in each party
and period. In Table 3.3, we present results from a multilevel fractional logit model
with varying intercepts for MPs predicting rebellion as a function of party status in
government, MPs’ ideological extremity, and critically, and interaction of these two
covariates. Extreme MPs generally rebel more frequently with the exception of the
Conservatives in the early period. Most importantly, the interaction term across all
models is positive and statistically significant. Ideological extremists in the Labour
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and Conservative Parties react to their governing party status in precisely the same
way in both time periods; namely, by becoming more rebellious. Like the previous
models, these results also control for MPs’ recent vote share, tenure and leadership.
Overall, our evidence strongly support our contention that ideologically extreme MPs
become more likely to rebel when their party becomes the governing party.
Table 3.3: Effect of Government Status on Rebellion: Fractional Logit Models with
Random Effects (Extremism Scores)
1992–2001 2005–2015
Labour Conservative Labour Conservative
Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12
Government 0.469∗∗∗ -0.084 1.477∗∗∗ 0.307∗∗∗
(0.166) (0.123) (0.090) (0.090)
Extremism Score 0.558 -1.672∗∗∗ 1.124∗∗ 1.448∗∗∗
(0.366) (0.516) (0.448) (0.488)
Majority -0.155 0.191∗ -1.224∗∗∗ 0.138
(0.102) (0.104) (0.143) (0.161)
Leader -1.123∗∗∗ -0.753∗∗∗ -1.015∗∗∗ -0.877∗∗∗
(0.205) (0.258) (0.294) (0.173)
Tenure 6.362∗∗∗ 2.758 16.556∗∗∗ 8.405∗∗∗
(2.187) (2.583) (4.217) (3.116)
Gov*Score 0.569∗∗ 3.398∗∗∗ 0.946∗∗∗ 1.109∗∗∗
(0.230) (0.421) (0.214) (0.222)
Constant -5.755∗∗∗ -5.779∗∗∗ -6.994∗∗∗ -6.551∗∗∗
(0.271) (0.197) (0.332) (0.319)
N 215 177 300 207
Log Likelihood -677.422 -501.155 -889.254 -683.803
∗∗∗p < .01; ∗∗p < .05; ∗p < .1 in a two-tailed t-test
To facilitate the interpretation of the coefficients in Table 3.3, we again plot the
predicted probability of a rebellion by both moderate and extreme MPs for the period
1992–2001 and 2005–2015 in Figure 3.2. We differentiate within the plot between
rebellion rates when these MPs are in government and in the opposition. As the figure
makes plain, changes in rebellion by moderate MPs as their party switches between
government and opposition are quite small in magnitude. In contrast, the likelihood
of ideological extremists’ rebelling significantly increased moving from opposition to
government. Thus, both in terms of statistical significance and substantive magnitude,
































































Figure 3.2: Probability of a Rebellious Vote in Government and Opposition by
Extremism (Wordscores)
are in line with our theoretical expectations.
These analyses allow us to make two key points. First, the most rebellious MPs
and those belonging to groups known to harbor more extreme ideological views rebel
in substantively different ways than other MPs. Namely, they do so relatively more
frequently when in government. Second, using a measure of ideology based on speech
content, we show that the most rebellious MPs tend to be ideological extremists
who are also more likely to rebel when in government. We suggest that this pattern
emerges because extremists use rebellion to develop individual identities distinct from
their party, helping signal a sort of ideological purity to ideological constituencies.
3.4.2 Rebel Speeches
Our theory suggests that when ideological extremists rebel in government, they ought
to try to explain that rebellion by pairing dissent on divisions with a speech on the
floor of parliament. That is, they are likely to defend their rebellion in a public forum
as part of their efforts to signal their ideological position to voters. Of course, we do
not believe that voters pay any direct attention to parliamentary debate. Rather MPs
may highlight their participation on the floor when communicating with constituents
in other ways, such as emails, newsletters, or perhaps social media. MPs often craft
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their message on the floor of parliament in terms of their constituency and their
voters. Using a simple dictionary, we find that a minimum of 20–25% of all speeches
during debates linked to divisions contain constituency language, with only little
variation between party and parliamentary term.19
Table 3.4 predicts the probability that an MP gives a speech during a debate
in which she has cast a rebellious vote (i.e. engages in grandstanding) conditional
on her overall speechmaking activity. In other words, our dependent variable is
Total Speeches on Rebel Votes
Total Speeches . As in our previous analyses, we model this proportion
using a fractional logistic regression with varying intercepts for individual MPs. As
independent variables, we include a dummy variable noting whether a particular
MP’s party is the governing party, whether the MP is one of the 25% most rebellious
members of her party (we use the 25% most rebellious variable here so as to preserve as
much data as possible, having already demonstrated above that ideological extremists
are more likely to rebel), an interaction of these two variables, and controls for a
member’s previous electoral vote share, whether the MP held a senior (or leadership)
role, and the MP’s length of tenure. If our expectations are correct, the most rebellious
members should be more likely to pair a rebellious vote with a speech, and to do so
more often when their party controls government.
As in our earlier models, we differentiate between the period 1992–2001 and 2005-
2015 to allow for any temporal heterogeneity in response to changes in government
control. The results in Table 3.4 show that MPs are more likely to dedicate a higher
proportion of their speeches to rebellious votes when in government. This effect is
captured by the coefficient on the Government dummy variable and suggests that
even for moderate members, the move from opposition to governing party implies
an increased need to defend rebellions from the party line through speech. In line
with our theory, the most rebellious members of both parties also make a higher
proportion of their speeches on divisions when they rebel. We have run models using
the Wordscores extremism variable and the results are substantively the same. But
19Our dictionary includes the following terms: “my constituen*” , “I represent” , “where I live”,
“my area” , “my surgery”, “my voters” , “my elector*”. Keyword-in-context searches reveal that
these phrases capture references to constituents and constituencies. However, other constituency
language not captured by these phrases almost certainly comes up in speech, making our estimate a
conservative one.
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note that in this model, the 25% most rebellious variable has a clear interpretation
— we wish to know whether rebellious members attach a higher proportion of their
speeches to rebellion. Interestingly, the interaction term is positive and significant
in the earlier period, but not the later period. Rebels tend to couple their rebellion
with speech at higher rate both in and out of government (but, of course, they rebel
much less frequently when in opposition).
Table 3.4: Effect of Government Status on Rebellious Speech: Fractional Logit Models
with Random Effects
1992–2001 2005–2015
Labour Conservative Labour Conservative
Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16
Government 0.683∗∗∗ 0.726∗∗∗ 1.740∗∗∗ 1.521∗∗∗
(0.243) (0.271) (0.288) (0.314)
Most Rebellious 1.296∗∗∗ 1.392∗∗∗ 2.981∗∗∗ 2.294∗∗∗
(0.241) (0.294) (0.289) (0.322)
Majority -0.166 0.239∗ -0.324∗ -0.042
(0.146) (0.141) (0.181) (0.221)
Leader -1.019∗∗ -0.884∗ -1.292∗∗ -1.810∗∗
(0.511) (0.493) (0.614) (0.745)
Tenure 7.573∗∗∗ 8.547∗∗∗ 6.797∗∗∗ 8.011∗∗∗
(2.529) (2.376) (2.245) (2.061)
Gov*Rebellious 0.856∗∗∗ 1.012∗∗∗ -0.426 0.153
(0.293) (0.339) (0.307) (0.339)
Constant -5.780∗∗∗ -6.429∗∗∗ -6.243∗∗∗ -6.123∗∗∗
(0.259) (0.277) (0.275) (0.337)
N 650 449 551 460
Log Likelihood -499.742 -460.432 -463.207 -468.966
∗∗∗p < .01; ∗∗p < .05; ∗p < .1 in a two-tailed t-test
Figure 3.3 plots the predicted probability of a rebel vote-speech pair out of all
speeches for typically loyal and typically rebellious members of each party when in
opposition and in government based on the coefficients reported in Table 3.4. The
figure shows that the predicted probability of a rebel vote-speech pairing increases
when a member moves from opposition to government, but highest probability of such
a pairing comes from rebels in government. This probability is not just the likelihood
of a rebel vote-speech pair in absolute terms, but rather the probability of a rebel
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Figure 3.3: Probability of a Rebellious Speech as a Function of Rebellion on Divisions
rebel vote-speech pair are quite large. For example, in the latter time period under
study, a rebellious member of the Labour Party uses just under 5% of her speeches
during times of rebellion. However, this same member uses nearly 15% of her total
speeches to discuss rebellion when in government. Not only do we find rebellious
behaviour at odds with extant models, but we find that the most rebellious MPs
speak about that rebellion at unusually high rates. It is not just that extremists (or
rebels) speak frequently, and not even that they speak frequently when in government,
but that they speak frequently in government when they rebel, compared both to
how frequently they speak when in opposition, and how frequently they speak when
they do not rebel.
In sum, the evidence from the parliamentary record suggests that the most
rebellious MPs rebel even more when their party is in government. Those same
rebellious MPs tend to be ideological extremists, and they are more likely to pair
rebellion on divisions with a speech on the floor. These patterns offer strong support
for our theory that these extremists engage in this rebellion for reasons of position-
taking. Such patterns are unlikely to be explained through models focused on policy
spaces, balancing between proposals and status quo locations, or commitments to
party politics. Instead, the patterns fit with a theory which suggests that rebellion
provides a means for MPs to differentiate themselves from their party, perhaps to
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connect with constituents for electoral gain.
3.4.3 Evidence for a Constituency Connection
We have provided evidence that ideologues rebel more often when in government and
participate in debates when they do so. We next look for evidence of a link between
constituency characteristics and rebellion on divisions. Specifically, we examine
rebellions within Tony Blair’s Labour government during its first term on divisions
related to welfare state politics; Blair’s first term was particularly notable for the
government’s “welfare-to-work” initiatives. We use information from Cowley (2002) to
code every Labour MP who rebelled on at least one division related to welfare politics.
We then relate rebellion to the proportion of each MP’s working-age constituents using
benefits. This measure has a direct link to the bills brought by Blair, which cut back
or restricted access to working-age benefits. There is significant variation in the use
of benefits across constituencies ranging from 6% to 39%, so the percentage receiving
benefits offers a clear measure of constituents’ needs. The earliest these benefits
data are available is 2000, making this the year that we use. This slightly post-dates
most of the welfare bills, but the measure changes very little over subsequent years.
In a bivariate logit model with rebellion as the dependent variable, we find that
the percentage of working-age constituents using benefits correlates strongly with
rebellion on these welfare-related divisions. The relationship is statistically significant
(p = 0.016) and moving from the first decile of the constituency benefits variable to
the ninth decile increases the likelihood of rebellion by approximately 11 percentage
points, from approximately 14% to 25%. Of course, this correlation cannot provide
evidence of a causal link between constituency characteristics and rebellion, but
combined with evidence from survey experiments regarding the values that voters
place on rebellion (Campbell et al., 2016) it is plausible that Labour MPs in these
constituencies view rebellion as a means to connect with voters.
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3.5 Discussion: The Labour Party under Corbyn
We expect our findings to hold under what we consider to be the normal working
conditions of a Westminster parliament. Our theory of party cohesion rests in part
on the assumption that party leaders depend on the support of their parliamentary
party to remain in power and that they represent mainstream views within the party.
The vote of no confidence — if passed — normally would result in the removal of
an unpopular or ineffective leader in either government or opposition. The Labour
Party under Jeremy Corbyn represents an important exception to this general rule. A
change to the procedure for party leader elections effectively removed the requirement
that a leader be vulnerable to the vote of no confidence.20 Jeremy Corbyn received
the minimum number of nominations from the parliamentary party (just 35 out 232
Labour MPs) to be placed on to the ballot for election by the wider party membership,
and the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) never truly viewed him as a legitimate
candidate. After less than a year as leader, Corbyn suffered a mass resignation of his
shadow cabinet, and a vote of no confidence over his handling of the EU referendum
campaign. However, Corbyn’s right to automatic inclusion on the ballot for what was
to be his second successful leadership election campaign confirmed the inability of
the PLP to act decisively with regard to its own leadership.
The imposition of a leader on the PLP affects our expectations for the ideological
source of rebellions and for the overall maintenance of party discipline. Corbyn is a
left-wing ideologue with a record of voting against Labour positions and no experience
whatever in frontbench politics. Under Corbyn, the position of the party leadership
has moved to the left, with fewer rebellions from the ideological extreme of the party.
This is likely the case simply because front bench positions have been filled by leftist
MPs loyal to Corbyn, thereby reducing the number of possible backbench rebellions
from the left. Regular rebels since Corbyn’s election come from the ideological right
20Past Labour leadership elections followed an electoral college design in which the parliamentary
party held a one-third weighting in the result. Reform to this process removed this requirement,
instead opting for a pooled vote of the entire Labour and Trade Union membership. The required
number of nominations for entry to the ballot was raised to 15% of the parliamentary Labour party,
which was thought to be high enough to preclude the entry of candidates from the party’s extreme
left.
54
of the party. Frank Field, Graham Stringer and Kate Hoey (MPs with more socially
conservative views) are now the most rebellious members in the Labour Party.
From the point of view of our model, we would argue that Corbyn’s leadership is
an historical anomaly. While preferences amongst MPs remain at odds with party
policy determined by principals external to parliament, we expect to see high levels
of rebellious activity and breakdowns in party discipline, more broadly.
3.6 Conclusion
This study has provided the first analysis of the UK House of Commons to systemically
evaluate how individual-level voting behaviour changes as function of the interaction
between government agenda control and individual-level ideology. It does so over
four different parliaments by examining two changes in governing party. We link
our findings on rebellion to debate on those same rebellious divisions. In doing so,
we believe we have created the most extensive database on voting behaviour and
speech in the House of Commons for the period under investigation. Lastly, this
represents one of the very few studies to examine rebellion among opposition parties
— a necessary step, we believe, to understand the level and importance of dissent
within governing parties.
Our results suggest that those ideological extremists who rebel the most engage in
even more rebellion when their party controls government. Moreover, they advertise
their rebellion through legislative speech. Coupled with existing findings that British
voters value some level of rebellion (Campbell et al., 2016; Vivyan and Wagner,
2012; Vivyan and Wagner, 2015), we take this as evidence that they engage in this
behaviour to advertise their position to constituents who likely agree with them.
While we have provided preliminary empirical evidence that MPs engage in
rebellion to represent constituents, future work will need to look at exactly how
MPs use rebellion and rebellious speech to connect with voters. Studies could look
at the content of legislative speech to try to ascertain its intended audience — e.g
the constituency or the party. Or they could examine how voters react to (the
advertisement of) rebellion, and whether this reaction varies if the rebellious MP is
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in the government or opposition and whether rebellion affects policy outcomes. A
more micro-level examination of such strategies goes beyond the scope of this study.







Among British Members of
Parliament
This Chapter examines patterns of career progression among MPs in the British
House of Commons. Its purpose is to bridge a gap in the knowledge of political
careers in Westminster systems by assessing the extent to which legislative behaviour
– as measured in parliamentary speech – impacts upon the first promotions of MPs to
front-bench positions.
Whereas studies on political careers in presidential systems tend to focus on
the individual behaviours of progressively ambitious politicians (Schlesinger, 1966;
Hibbing, 1986; Herrick and Moore, 1993; Carey et al., 2009; Treul, 2009; Victor,
2010), studies of careers in parliamentary democracies tends to focus on the selection
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and deselection of cabinet ministers from a prime minister’s perspective (Laver and
Shepsle, 1994; Strøm et al., 2003; Dowding and Dumont, 2008; Allen and Ward,
2009; Dewan and Myatt, 2010; Kam et al., 2010; Dowding and Dumont, 2014). This
approach, which is arguably appropriate to parliamentary democracy, nevertheless
does not accredit politicians in parliamentary and Westminster systems with the
same level of agency as do studies of legislators in presidential systems.
By focusing on the behaviour of individual politicians, studies of the consequences
of political ambition in parliamentary democracy may reveal more than the patterns
of behaviour which lead to the attainment of higher office. They may also yield
valuable insights into how ambitious politicians approach representation (Sieberer
and Mu¨ller, 2017). This study builds on the literature tracking the career patterns of
individual legislators in parliamentary democracies (Piper, 1991; Kam et al., 2010;
Smith and Martin, 2017; Sieberer and Mu¨ller, 2017) with a particular focus on the
impact of parliamentary behaviour. This approach is novel because it tracks the
impact of individual legislative behaviour on career outcomes. It also takes a wider
view of careers in parliament, analysing a range of frontbench roles as well as cabinet
ministers.
To test the impact of parliamentary behaviour on career progression, I track
the entire parliamentary careers of 847 MPs between 1945 and 2010, and test the
association between the quantity and content of parliamentary speechmaking and
appointments to front-bench positions. I argue that the study of parliamentary
debate and career progression is important for the following three reasons: first, a key
attribute of ministerial skill is parliamentary ability in debate (Norton, 2005, p. 65;
Thatcher, 1993, p. 317). Second, previous studies of parliamentary behaviour and
political careers (Piper, 1991; Benedetto and Hix, 2007; Kam, 2006) have been limited
to the study of parliamentary voting patterns and party loyalty. The measurement and
comparison of the patterns of parliamentary debate with respect to career progression
is now a feasible empirical task thanks to the development of quantitative text
analysis techniques. This presents a wider range of opportunities for theorisation and
measurement, as this Chapter will show.
Third, in parliamentary systems with high levels of party unity, parliamentary
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speech conveys a large amount of information about the individual behaviours of
MPs, which would not be visible when looking at voting patterns (Spirling and
McLean, 2007; Proksch and Slapin, 2015). The further study of speech patterns
in parliamentary debate is slowly revealing that the differences between U.S. style
legislative behaviour and parliamentary legislative behaviours are matters of degree
rather than of kind (Slapin et al., 2018; Kirkland and Slapin, 2017; Sieberer and
Mu¨ller, 2017). This Chapter follows on in this vein, showing the importance of
legislative speech in determining the trajectory of political careers.
After controlling for several explanatory covariates including previous career, age,
education, party and gender, I find strong evidence that the volume of speeches
made by early-career parliamentarians is positively associated with the likelihood of
promotion, negatively associated with time to first promotion, and is most strongly
associated with promotions to parliamentary roles that require strong debate skills. I
find weaker associations to support the hypothesis that the content of speeches (here
measured in the form of policy specialisation, focus on local issues, and confident
word usage) also affects the career progression of MPs in their early career. Crucial
to the causal claim of this Chapter is the finding that higher levels of speech partici-
pation, higher levels of confident use of language, and lower levels of local focus, all
positively affect the likelihood of appointment to ministerial type roles (appointments
of undersecretaries of state, the lowest rank of minister, are particularly sensitive to
speechmaking). However, the role of whip – a position that prohibits holders from
taking the floor – remains unaffected by any measure of parliamentary speech.
4.1 Literature: Ambition and Office Seeking
Across Legislative Systems
The value in studying office-seeking behaviour is in subjecting the underlying prefer-
ences for foundational theories of political science to closer examination (Sieberer and
Mu¨ller, 2017; Downs, 1957; Riker, 1962). Schlesinger’s (1966) analysis of politicians
in the United States identifies three types of ambition: (i) discrete ambition in which
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representatives see politics as instrumental to pursuing other career goals; (ii) static
ambition – in which MPs aim to stay in their position for as long as possible; and (iii)
progressive ambition – where MPs seek higher political office. Analyses examining
the consequences of progressive ambition (Hibbing, 1986; Herrick and Moore, 1993;
Carey et al., 2009; Treul, 2009; Victor, 2010) show that the career pathways available
to progressively ambitious politicians have important implications for their approach
to representation. For example Victor (2010) shows that in the US House of Repre-
sentatives, legislators with progressive ambition tend to specialise in particular policy
arenas in order to improve their chances of re-election and legislative success while
only generalising their political behaviour when they seek election to higher office.
However, analysis of political careers in parliamentary systems tends to focus on
the causes and consequences of selection and deselection of cabinet ministers (Laver
and Shepsle, 1994; King, 1994; Strøm et al., 2003; Kam, 2006; Benedetto and Hix,
2007; Dowding and Dumont, 2008; Allen and Ward, 2009; Dewan and Myatt, 2010;
Kam et al., 2010; Dowding and Dumont, 2014; Klein and Umit, 2016; Smith and
Martin, 2017). These studies are important in illuminating the criteria considered
by prime ministers in promoting and demoting senior politicians, a subtly different
empirical and theoretical question to the promotion of early-career MPs. Nevertheless,
these studies provide context for this Chapter in two important areas: first, they
illuminate the incentive structure for political career progression particular to the
Westminster system. Second, they highlight those characteristics that may motivate
prime ministers and party leaders to choose ministers from the pool of available
candidates.
In terms of the structure of political careers, parliamentary systems and the
Westminster system in particular differ to presidential regimes in how the executive
are appointed. Firstly, the Westminster system fuses two goals deemed central to a
legislator’s success: office and policy (see Kam (2006) citing Strøm and Mu¨ller (1999)).
Individual MPs have little opportunity to change the policy landscape without the
support of the governing party, and influence within the governing party is highly
dependent on position. Therefore, MPs with ambitions beyond re-election should
attempt to achieve promotion to the frontbench in order to achieve these goals.
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Indeed, it has been argued that the dual monopoly held by party leaders over policy
and the allocation of frontbench positions is the primary explanatory factor behind
the high levels of party cohesion observed in Westminster systems (Piper, 1991; Kam,
2006; Benedetto and Hix, 2007).
Secondly, the relative lack of checks and balances on Westminster governments,
combined with the convention that executives are chosen from within the legislature
has resulted in long-term screening processes to select suitable leadership candidates
from elected MPs (Saalfeld, 2003; Strøm et al., 2003; Strøm, 2000, p. 629). According
to De Winter (1991, p. 48), British MPs spend the longest time in the legislature
before being selected to the cabinet when compared with other Western European
democracies. This screening time, though somewhat diminished in recent years
(Cowley, 2012; Atkins et al., 2013), is seen as crucial to the selection of ‘good types’
(Fearon, 1999) to execute public policy effectively and accountably. In sum, relative
to other political systems, MPs in a Westminster system have a greater incentive to
seek office in order to achieve policy goals. Additionally, they must seek the approval
of party leaders who retain an effective monopoly over office allocation and policy
direction, and they must also serve a long apprenticeship before taking on a senior
role.
But what are the necessary criteria for ministerial selection? A common strand
in studies of ministerial selection is that they are theorised in principal-agent terms
(Dowding and Dumont, 2014; Kam et al., 2010; Strøm et al., 2003). There is, however,
some debate about whether it is party leaders or parties themselves that take the
role of principal. Since the electorate delegates to a parliamentary party, which then
delegates to a prime minister who in turn delegates ministerial positions back to the
legislature, a prime minister’s choice of cabinet colleagues is not as free as it may
seem. Kam et al. (2010) show that ideological proximity to the ideological centre
of the party is a more reliable predictor of ministerial selection than is proximity to
the party leader. Other studies of the Westminster system also theorise ideological
positioning as the driving force behind ministerial selection. Allen and Ward (2009)
approach the selection of Westminster cabinets in a multidimensional policy space,
in which the objective of selection is to ensure that the prime minister retains the
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median (and therefore decisive) position in cabinet policy discussion. Indridason and
Kam (2005; 2008) argue that cabinet reshuﬄes can be theorised as a means to reduce
agency loss caused by ministers’ policy preferences drifting in the direction of their
assigned department.
However, policy preferences are not the only criteria to consider when allocating
ministerial appointments. King (1994, p. 224) argues that the majority of cabinet
ministers are not strong policy advocates in any direction, and so position themselves
in order to make their progression to high office as smooth as possible. Therefore,
whilst policy positioning is important, it is unlikely to be sufficient for promotion
to high office. Dewan and Myatt (2010) argue that as the tenure of a government
progresses, the pool of ministerial talent declines. Prime ministers maximise utility on
the effectiveness of the government given the size of the talent pool, selecting qualified
candidates for ministerial positions independently from ideal policy positioning.
Quiroz-Flores and Smith (2011; 2016) consider the importance of ministerial ability
in democracies cf. autocracies, finding that electoral competition forces parties to
select competent ministers at the cost of political stability. Huber and Martinez-
Gallardo (2008) show that other institutional factors such as the constitutional power
of ministers, coalition attributes and the average seniority of new ministers – all
measures associated with adverse selection – affect the duration of individual ministers
across 19 parliamentary democracies.
Finally, when analysing the individual characteristics of candidates for ministerial
selection, Klein and Umit (2016) show that a strong electoral majority is also an
important factor associated with ministerial selection: strong parliamentary majorities
from the outset improve the chances of promotion, though improved majorities go
unrewarded on average. Similarly, Smith and Martin (2017) argue that the informa-
tional advantage bestowed on the sons and daughters of former cabinet ministers
affects the likelihood of their selection to the cabinet. Indeed, the prior experience and
background of MPs before entering parliament has a strong conditioning effect on the
likelihood of ministerial selection (Rose, 1971; Cowley, 2012). This is a phenomenon
that increasingly advantages ‘career politicians’ whose careers have been exclusively
in the field of politics.
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Whilst the above contributions to the study of ministerial selection are analogous
to the study of early career MPs, important gaps remain in our understanding of early
career progression among politicians in Westminster democracy that this Chapter
aims to address. Sieberer and Mu¨ller (2017) explore the attitudinal effects of progres-
sive ambition in 15 parliamentary democracies using MP surveys. They find clear
differences between progressively ambitious and statically ambitious MPs. Similarly,
Searing (1994) finds that ministerial aspirants are distinct in their motivations for
power and influence, but unclear in their intended course of action. Sieberer and
Mu¨ller argue that to further explore the consequences of individual political ambition
in parliamentary democracy, we must analyse the behaviours (as well as attitudes)
of ambitious politicians to gain a sense of how progressive ambition impacts upon
political careers and on representation more broadly, a suggestion followed by this
chapter.
4.1.1 The Differential Effect of Speechmaking on
Parliamentary Role Allocations
Often, the goal of text analysis in political science is to show an underlying ideological
dimension (Laver et al., 2003; Slapin and Proksch, 2008; Benoit et al., 2016), yet
left-right ideology is far from the only data generating process behind political text,
especially political speech (Austen-Smith and Banks, 2000; Beauchamp, 2011; Kim
et al., 2014). Arguably, of the observable legislative behaviours in the Westminster
system, speechmaking is one of the few ways to compare politicians on their likelihood
of obtaining higher office. Parliamentary speech in the House of Commons conveys a
comparatively large amount of information on individual differences (O’Grady, 2016;
Slapin et al., 2018), as opposed to legislative voting, where party unity is high (Poole,
2005; Spirling and McLean, 2007). Backbench MPs, despite being constrained at the
ballot box, are relatively free to make speeches to the House (Proksch and Slapin,
2015, p. 164). In the following section, I argue for the importance of parliamentary
debate in determining political career progression and then point to four patterns of
parliamentary speech behaviour that should capture these effects.
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A major requirement of frontbench ministerial roles is parliamentary debate.
Oratory skill in defence of government policy in parliament is so important that,
according to Norton (2005, p. 65): “there is the danger that parliamentary skills may
be elevated over skills that may be just as necessary to control and lead a government
department.” Norton (2005, p. 65). We should therefore expect that ministers are
chosen in part for their ability at the despatch box and that such ability may be
measurable in the content of their political speeches.
However, early career progression among new MPs may take many forms in the
first instance other than selection to the cabinet. In fact, it is quite rare for MPs to
be promoted to the cabinet on their first appointment to the frontbench, as Table 4.1
shows. MPs are more likely to first take on junior or mid-ranking ministerial roles, or
become party whips or parliamentary private secretaries; each of these roles requires
different skills and MPs may be chosen in these roles on the basis of quite different
criteria than those applied to cabinet ministers.
Whips, for example, differ markedly from ministers in their Parliamentary respon-
sibilities. They are “paid to listen” (Critchley, 1978, p. 468) and by convention do not
speak at all in the Chamber. Indeed, when in Parliament, whips are engaged in mon-
itoring and reporting on the performances of others in the chamber for the purposes
of minister evaluation and prospects for promotion. Given that the parliamentary
roles of whips and ministers are entirely different, position allocation should reflect
behaviour and performance according to the requirements of a given role. Therefore,
I refine my argument: speechmaking in Parliament should matter for the selection
of ministers at all levels but should not matter for the selection of whips, for whom
speechmaking is not required.
A differential effect of speechmaking on types of parliamentary career is important
because it demonstrates the specific linkage between roles and their required compe-
tencies. Whilst this study is observational and cannot make a claim that speech is
exogenous to role allocation, a keen association between speechmaking and promotion
to specific roles bolsters any causal claim about the effect of speechmaking on parli-
mentary careers. For instance, it would rule out claims that speechmaking among
early-career backbenchers is simply a reflection of an individual’s pre-existing general
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Table 4.1: First appointments by role 1950-2015 (opposition equivalents in brackets)
Position Freq. Percent
Cabinet Ministers (Shadow Cabinet) 27 2.6
Ministers of State (Shadow Ministers) 63 6.2
Parliamentary Secretaries and Under Secretaries (Shadow
Spokespeople)
262 25.7
Assistant Whips 169 16.6
Remained Backbenchers 498 48.9
Source: UK Parliament - Members’ Names Data Platform
stature within the party. If that were the case, we might expect all progressively
ambitious MPs to behave in the same way, with similar patterns of parliamentary
behaviour.
4.1.2 Participation
The incentive for aspiring MPs to speak was wryly acknowledged by Julian Critchley
– a former Conservative MP and political commentator. He argues that the ambitious
Tory should speak regularly, not to be discouraged by a lack of interest in their
participation, or that the potential audience is small: “Politics, like show business
and the church, is a performing art. We are as good as our last speech: some of
us are even better” (Critchley, 1978, p. 469). This assertion of the importance of
debate and parliamentary skills provides justification for the general hypothesis that
ambitious new MPs should participate in parliamentary debate, either to showcase
their skills, or to learn the trade.
With regard to the skills required by ministers in the Westminster system, speech-
making is considered central. Questions to Ministers – departmental versions of the
better known Prime Minister’s Questions – form a large proportion of the day-to-day
monitoring of government activity. According to Margaret Thatcher: “Norman
[Tebbit] was . . . one of the Party’s most effective performers in Parliament . . . the
fact that the Left howled disapproval confirmed that he was just the right man for
the job.” (Thatcher, 1993, p. 317).
Additionally, spending time making speeches in Westminster, as opposed to being
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in their constituency, may be an early signal of intent from progressively ambitious
politicians that they intend to rise in national politics. Practising debate, making good
impressions, developing contacts and generally ‘making a mark’ are identified as key
modus operandi of ministerial aspirant MPs (Searing, 1994, p. 87). Indeed, spending
more time in the constituency is a hallmark of backbench MPs, not frontbench
MPs (Norris, 1997) and so spending more time in their constituency may represent
a significant opportunity cost relative to participating in the legislative process in
Westminster. Accordingly, I present the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Higher levels of debate participation improves
prospects for promotion to the frontbench.
In the empirical section, apply three tests for this hypothesis. First, I argue that
increased participation in parliamentary debate will improve the likelihood (H1a) of
an eventual promotion to the frontbench. In addition, I argue that speechmaking will
only affect the likelihood of promotion to ministerial posts. Accordingly, I predict
that the position of Assistant Whip will not be affected by participation in debate,
since their role does not include speechmaking (H1b). Finally, I predict that the
waiting time for promotion will be decreased by increased debate participation (H1c).
4.1.3 Specialisation
The second proposed speech characteristic is a measure of policy specialisation.
Literature on American politics argues that ambitious members should seek to
specialise on policy (Herrick and Moore, 1993; Victor, 2010). Victor (2010) states
that ambitious politicians ought to specialise during normal time in order to show
competence and be perceived as effective on policy issues relevant to their own
constituents, only generalising their political interests immediately before seeking
election to higher office.
From the point of view of the Westminster system, however, specialisation may
in fact be a hindrance to ministerial selection. Firstly, over-specialisation may be
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harmful due to the relative lack of ex post monitoring of minister behaviour. King
(1994, p. 204) gives an example of Richard Crossman, who was “thought to know
too much about education” and was therefore made minister for housing and local
government. Specialisation might also be undesirable because the talent pool for
potential ministers is small and resignations can happen quickly and often due to
unforeseen circumstances (Berlinski et al., 2010; Berlinski et al., 2012). Under such
circumstances, a general competence is certainly preferable to a specialised one. The
collective responsibility of cabinets, in which each minister must vote on every act of
the government, also requires that ministers have a broad range of policy knowledge.
Indeed, the ultimate generalists in the political hierarchy are the prime minister
and opposition party leaders. Consequently, specialisation is likely to be negatively
associated with career progression in the British Parliament:
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Higher levels of policy specialisation in debate
decreases the prospects of promotion to the frontbench.
Similarly to H1, I divide my analysis in to three parts. H2a expects a negative
association between specialisation and promotion to the frontbench in general. H2b
tests for negative associations between specialisation and promotion to different
parliamentary roles (with the specific expected null effect on promotion to the role of
Assistant Whip). Finally, H2c tests for a positive association between specialisation
and the duration of time taken to be promoted to the frontbench.
4.1.4 Focus on Local Issues
Similarly to policy specialisation, the role of local representation in the Westminster
system differs from the American context. Local representation in Britain is largely
seen as a matter of the ‘redress of grievances’ (Searing, 1994), with MPs responding to
constituents on ad hoc issues of importance, rather than general policy. MPs wishing
to support their local constituency often do so not by introducing legislation, but
by taking soundings from the community in regular MP’s surgeries, solving issues
personally where possible, and relaying matters of importance to the government,
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either in the House or in direct correspondence with relevant ministers.
The degree to which MPs are ‘constituency members’ (Searing, 1994, p. 121) is
significant for party leaders looking to select suitable candidates for promotion. The
basic premise for this consideration is the possibility of role conflict between local
and national representation (Searing, 1994, p. 325). In the House of Commons –
a body primarily set up to discuss issues of national policy – ambitious MPs are
encouraged to behave in a manner that minimises the significance of the constituency,
and maximises opportunities to be seen as ‘ministers in waiting’.
The connection between focus on local issues and speech may be captured by
backbencher questions to the government. Many backbench MPs speak regularly in
the Commons on local issues in order to put local issues to the government. MPs
may then present coverage of these questions as proof of representation. However, an
excessive focus on local issues may betray an unwillingness or inability on the part of
an MP to take on frontbench roles, which require a strong focus on national rather
than local policy agendas. Therefore, the following hypotheses suggest a negative
relationship between focus on local issues and career progression in the House of
Commons:
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Focus on local issues decreases the prospects of
promotion to the frontbench.
As above, H3a expects a negative general association between focus on local
issues and promotion to the frontbench; H3b expects negative associations between
promotions to ministerial positions, with no effect on promotions to the Whip’s Office;
H3c expects increased focus on local issues to be associated with increased duration
to first promotion.
4.1.5 Confidence
In the wider social science literature, the value of appearing confident for the purposes
of career progression is well documented in both psychology (Anderson et al., 2012;
Johnson and Fowler, 2011; Borgen and Betz, 2008) and labour economics (Whitely
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et al., 1991; Dacre Pool and Sewell, 2007; McQuaid, 2006). However, political
science, and in particular legislative studies, has largely left alone such subtleties of
communication. Anecdotal evidence suggests that communication style is crucial to
political success but difficulties in measurement and an academic focus on content
over delivery have restricted its study.1
This Chapter provides an opportunity to test studies of social and political
psychology in the arena of career promotion in the House of Commons. In practice,
many speeches in parliamentary debate are choreographed for political content,
as MPs have clear incentives to toe the party line, but the style of delivery in
large part reflects personal taste. Furthermore, such idiosyncrasies in delivery style
should be more authentic in early career backbenchers, since they do not usually
have access to speechwriters, a privilege generally reserved for ministers and party
leadership. Therefore the measurement of confidence in speech behaviour in the
House of Commons, especially in the early careers of politicians, may be considered a
novel and potentially fruitful opportunity to bridge a gap between literatures in the
social sciences.
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Higher levels of confident language increases the
prospects of promotion to the frontbench.
This hypothesis is also subdivided into 3 empirical tests: H4a expects confident
language to be positively associated with promotion to the frontbench; H4b tests
the effect of confident language on different parliamentary roles with a null-effect
expectation for whips; finally, H4c expects that confident language will decrease the
duration between entry to parliament and first promotion to the frontbench.
1But see Fausey and Matlock (2011), who note the effect of how the ostensibly apolitical framing
of political messages affects interpretation. Nuances as subtle as changing the tense from the perfect
(did, went) to the imperfect (was doing, was going) can have significant effects in the perceptions
of the electorate in terms of voting intention; Hermann and Milburn (1977) and Hermann (1980)
for analysis of the effect of personality types (as measured in speeches) on foreign policy decision
making.
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4.2 Evidence from Early-Career MPs in the UK
House of Commons
This study measures the career paths of 847 MPs from 1945-2010. Cases for analysis
were selected based on the following criteria: first, I follow Schlesinger (1966) in
placing emphasis on analysing the entire careers of politicians, in order to see the full
picture. I therefore restrict the analysis to those MPs who left the House before 2010,
and have not returned since. Furthermore, limitations to the availability of important
background information detailed below restrict observations to those members who
serving as MPs at any point between 1992 and 2001. Additionally, I restrict the
analysis to MPs of the Conservative and Labour parties, since they are roughly
comparable in size. Smaller parties have a shorter promotion ladder, with fewer
prospects of achieving high office in government.
4.2.1 Dependent Variable: First Promotions to the
Frontbench Among British MPs
I take three measures of an MP’s first promotion to the frontbench in any official
parliamentary capacity either in opposition or in government. The first measurement
(A) is binary: whether or not an MP is selected in their entire parliamentary career.
The second measurement (B) is a categorical specification of the types of role that
MPs are promoted to on their first appointment. Table 4.1 shows the distribution
of first appointments. Note that promotions to junior ministerial positions and
whips dominate first promotions, while direct promotion from the backbench to the
position of party leader do not occur in the present sample. Sub-cabinet ministerial
positions are further divided into Ministers of State (ministers with sub-departmental
responsibility), and parliamentary undersecretaries (directly subordinate to a cabinet
minister). Finally, the categorisation includes assistant whips, who are frontbench
officials responsible for ensuring party discipline. A notable exception to the classifi-
cation scheme is the parliamentary private secretary. While such appointments are
sometimes seen as important for parliamentary career progression (Searing, 1994),
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their unofficial ‘private’ status as assistants to ministers makes the data difficult to
obtain reliably, and are therefore not included within the analysis. The third measure
of promotion (C) is the duration from the end of an MP’s first term until the point
they are either promoted or leave parliament.
4.2.2 Measuring Speech Patterns in Parliamentary Debate
The primary resource for researchers looking to access the Parliamentary record is
Hansard,2 and a full record from 1935 is available in an online directory on the website
They Work For You, a subsidiary of My Society3. With this raw data, I wrote custom
scripts in Python to group and manage the data into documents of the complete
debate performance of an MP over the course of their first parliamentary term. The
following paragraphs discuss the operationalisation of the text based measurements
used to analyse political signals relevant to ministerial selection.
Participation: Debate participation is defined as the word count of each MP
during their first term of debates in the House of Commons, and is obtained by
counting the number of words spoken by each MP. Other studies of parliamentary
participation tend to use the number of speeches made (Baumann et al., 2015; Proksch
and Slapin, 2015; Ba¨ck et al., 2014), but in the case of the Hansard data, the number
of speeches made may not necessarily reflect overall participation, as the data contain
many interjections, lasting only a few words, which would be classified at the same
level of participation as a prepared speech. For this reason, and for the reason that
the variables defined below are derived from token based statistics, the study proceeds
by operationalising participation as word count.
Policy Specialisation: Policy specialisation is defined as the number of policy
areas mentioned per parliamentary term relative to the estimated mean of logged
tokens spoken by each MP. The 46 policy areas were collected from the website of the
2Hansard, begun in the late 18th Century, was named after one of its principal founders Thomas
Curson Hansard. At the time, the simple act of reporting the proceedings of government, something
we now regard as a vital element of governance and even trivial or mundane, was akin to an act
of treason. After a century of censorship and unofficial clandestine reports – often veiled under
the pretence of recording the minutes of outlandish secret societies. Titles such as Proceedings of
the Lower Room of the Robin Hood Society and Debates of the Senate of Magna Lilliputia were
common at the time and even earlier in the 18th century. Parliament finally took on the production
and publishing of verbatim debates itself in 1909.
3http://www.theyworkforyou.com/pwdata/scrapedxml/debates/
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British Government4, and converted into a dictionary. I created a relation (0,1) matrix
with MPs on the rows, and policy areas in the columns. The number of policy areas
mentioned by each MP over the course of a term were then counted, and combined
in linear regression with the overall logged number of tokens. The residuals from this
regression were saved and used to create a normally distributed variable of policy
specialisation. This measure of specialisation differs from the roll-call measures often
used in non-Westminster institutions (Herrick and Moore, 1993), but is similar to that
employed by Victor (2010) in that it is derived from floor speeches. The steps taken to
derive the measure are visualised in Figure 4.1. The first graph [upper left] shows the
relationship between the number of policy areas mentioned and debate participation
(participation measured as overall word count). The second graph [upper right] shows
the same relationship with the natural log of the number of tokens. The bottom two
graphs show that the residuals of the regression are normally distributed (but not
independent of word count). The final values for policy specialisation correspond to
the residual value from a regression drawn through the data [upper right] and then
inverted, since positive residuals actually represent policy versatility.
Focus on Local Issues: A measure of an MP’s focus on their own constituency
was created by following Kellermann (2016) in measuring the ratio of mentions of the
word stem ‘constituen*’ relative to overall word count. Creating a more expansive
dictionary for this variable proved difficult, as the inclusion of more words such as
constituency names merely increased the inconsistency of measurements. It is no
longer clear if an MP who mentions the constituency name ‘Bolsover’ is talking
with reference to their own constituency for local purposes, or for the purpose of
discussing some issue of national policy, which has the local dimension ‘Bolsover’
included within it.
Confidence: A measure of confident language usage is taken from the psychomet-
ric dictionary Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) (Pennebaker et al., 2001).5
The LIWC dictionary includes a measure of certainty, comprised of a dictionary with
around 100 words and word stems in the lexical field of certainty, and confidence is
4https://www.gov.uk/government/topics


















































Figure 4.1: Measuring policy specialisation from speech participation
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included among them. LIWC is a proprietary resource, and so the full dictionary may
not be made available in this study. However a illustrative sample of the dictionary
is permissible within the licence:
absolute, absolutely, altogether, always, certain*, clear, clearly, com-
mit, commitment*, commits, committ*, complete, completed, completely,
completes, confidence, confident, confident, truly, truth*, unambigu*, un-
doubt*, unquestion*, wholly.
This measure is calculated similarly to the localism measure by taking the ratio of
the number of times words included in the dictionary appear relative to overall word
count.
4.2.3 Control Variables
Information on the background of MPs is also important for understanding the career
prospects of new entrants into the House of Commons. The inclusion of co-explanatory
variables such as age of entry to Parliament, and educational privilege (a dummy
coded as 1 if the MP attended Oxford or Cambridge) are motivated by other recent
quantitative studies of ministerial selection (Berlinski et al., 2012; Dalvean, 2012).
Historically, entry at a relatively young age was of particular importance, since the
median number of years’ parliamentary experience before selection to the cabinet
stood at 14.2 years during the period 1868-1968 (Willson, 1959; Willson, 1970).
Ambitious MPs needed to have been relatively young on entry to Parliament, in order
to avoid being seen as too old for promotion by the time they had enough experience
to be considered for promotion.
Other measures such as whether or not the MP had a previous political occupation
in politics (the variable named Politico, coded as 1 if an MP’s primary prior occupation
was political in nature, 0 otherwise) is inspired by previous work on the changing
professional make-up of the House (Cairney, 2007; Cowley, 2012; King, 1981). The
expected relationship is that prior political experience improves chances of promotion.
The inclusion of gender is motivated by the consideration that party leaders may feel
obliged to promote more women in order to make up for their under-representation in
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the house as a whole (Norris, 1995). Data on professional and educational backgrounds
are taken from Cowley and Norton in their work on rebellions in the House (Norton,
1997; Cowley and Norton, 1999; Cowley, 2002). Data on date-of-birth and gender
are taken from the Member’s Names Data Platform of the British Government (UK
Parliament, 2015).
Controlling for party, term length and the date of entry to parliament are necessary
for the improved comparison of observations. Promotion practices may vary between
political parties, because of differences in political culture, and because it cannot be
assumed that government and opposition recruit in the same manner. Controlling
with a dummy variable for a Labour MP effectively controls for both differences in
party as well as differences between government and opposition at the same time.
Term length has an important effect on behavioural variables, since the length of
the term is related to the number of words spoken in that term by each MP; by
controlling for the length of the parliamentary term, the analysis allows comparison
between terms. Related to term length is entry date. Including the date of entry
for each MP controls for the effects of unobserved changes over time to the political
system, and also promotion practices.
4.2.4 A: The Likelihood of Promotion
Table 4.2 displays results of a binary logistic regression. The response variable is
measured as 1 if an MP is promoted to a frontbench position in their parliamentary
career, and 0 otherwise. The models provide initial evidence to support the association
between parliamentary debate and first promotions of MPs in the House of Commons.
Participation (H1a) – the measure of overall speechmaking – is calculated as the
number of words spoken by a member in their entire first term in parliament. This
is then divided by 1000, to aid readability of regression results. When included in
Models 1 and 5, the coefficient is positive and statistically significant, robust to the
inclusion of background information and other parliamentary signals. The coefficients
for policy specialisation (Specialist), focus on local issues (Localism) and the use of
confident language (Confidence) are all statistically significant and in the expected
directions. Higher specialisation leads to lower rates of promotion (H2a), as does a
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focus on local issues (H3a). Confident language improves the probability of ministerial
selection (H4a).
However, these variables lose statistical reliability when included with participa-
tion. A possible exception might be confidence, which remains close to statistically
significant at the 5% level (z-score=1.86). This loss of statistical confidence is due
to the high level of dependence between word count (participation) and the other
measures of speech, a problem that accordingly affects the coefficients and standard
errors of speech-based variables in model 5. Therefore, a conservative conclusion to
results interpretation must be that the quantity of participation (H1a) is a robust
indicator, while measures of speech content (H2a, H3a and H4a) are far less reliable
determinants of career progression.
Background explanatory variables such as age of entry, having been to Oxford or
Cambridge, and a previous career in politics are all predictive and highly statistically
significant – indicating a general preference for younger, elite educated (Oxbridge)
career (Politico) politicians. Interestingly, in the sample measured for this study,
female MPs are not promoted to the frontbench more or less often than men. This
does not provide evidence against gender based discrimination within ministries (for
example women being restricted to ‘social’ or ‘soft’ portfolios, see Curtin et al. (2014))
– but suggests that women may not be hindered in achieving some sort of government
or opposition frontbench appointment.
Figure 4.2 shows substantive changes in probability distributions for varying
levels of the four speech variables (taken from Table 4.2, Model 5), holding all other
estimates at their means (or proportions for binary variables). For each speech variable,
three probability distributions are estimated, with uncertainty corresponding to the
likelihood of selection to the frontbench, given a specified level of the speechmaking
variable in question. The white distributions estimate values of speech variables fixed
at a low level (25th percentile), grey distributions a medium level (50th percentile)
and black at a high level (75th percentile). The lines within the distributions show
the 95% interval. Note that while evidence can be seen for movement towards
separation of distributions for Localism and Confidence, the same cannot be said
for Specialisation. Only in the case of Participation do the 25th percentile and 75th
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Table 4.2: Logistic regression models of promotion to the frontbench.









Female 0.369 0.390 0.306 0.318 0.316
(0.339) (0.340) (0.343) (0.341) (0.343)
Entry Age −0.109∗∗∗ −0.112∗∗∗ −0.118∗∗∗ −0.113∗∗∗ −0.113∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
Oxbridge 0.568∗∗∗ 0.584∗∗∗ 0.564∗∗∗ 0.570∗∗∗ 0.502∗∗∗
(0.169) (0.169) (0.169) (0.169) (0.172)
Politico 0.713∗∗ 0.681∗∗ 0.696∗∗ 0.718∗∗ 0.721∗∗
(0.283) (0.281) (0.281) (0.281) (0.284)
Labour 0.090 0.153 0.189 0.262 0.151
(0.162) (0.160) (0.160) (0.162) (0.166)
Entry Date 0.00004∗ 0.0001∗∗∗ 0.0001∗∗∗ 0.0001∗∗∗ 0.0001∗∗
(0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002)
Term Length −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Constant 4.388∗∗∗ 4.518∗∗∗ 5.127∗∗∗ 3.457∗∗∗ 3.940∗∗∗
(0.568) (0.565) (0.619) (0.698) (0.806)
N 847 847 847 847 847
Log Likelihood −508.576 −513.849 −512.374 −513.866 −504.463
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
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percentile distributions separate without an overlap of the 95% confidence intervals.
That said, difference of means tests show significant differences of means between
the 75th and 25th percentiles for each of the variables included. In sum, the results
for the logistic regression show that parliamentary speech from the beginning of an
MP’s career have robust associations with later appointments to the frontbench. In
particular, parliamentary participation shows a strong positive association, local focus
and confident language show moderate to strong statistical effects, while the role of
policy specialisation is less clear.
4.2.5 B: Promotion to Different Frontbench Roles
Turning attention to Table 4.3, a multinomial approach allows us to gain a more
nuanced view of the types of parliamentary role to which MPs are appointed. Table
4.3 shows the results of a single multinomial regression of ministerial category on
the full set of coefficients (previously included in Table 4.2, Model 5). The model
estimates the likelihood of selection into different categories of ministerial role, relative
to the baseline category, in which MPs remain career-long backbenchers.
As the results in Table 4.3 show, parliamentary speech has very different effects for
different categories of frontbench position, providing further support for the theory
that parliamentary speech matters for ministerial selection as a measure of aptitude
for the role in question. Speech behaviour does not separate backbench members
from those selected to be assistant whips in any significant manner, confirming that
speechmaking competence is not a relevant skill for the Whip’s Office. Conversely,
speechmaking has significant effects for selection to the cabinet, ministers of state,
and undersecretaries. Notable results for the background estimations suggest that
Oxbridge attendees are more likely to be fast-tracked directly to the cabinet as a
first appointment, whilst MPs with previous careers in politics were more likely to be
granted roles in junior ministerial positions. Younger entrants were more likely to be
selected to all positions, in line with the expectation that younger MPs have a longer
parliamentary career ahead of them. Finally, women were marginally more likely to































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4.3: Multinomial logit estimation of ministerial selection from the backbench.
Ministerial Role
Cabinet Minister of State Under Secretary Assistant Whip
Participation 0.010 0.015*** 0.011*** 0.004
(0.007) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005)
Specialisation -1.055 0.256 0.115 0.168
(0.703) (0.429) (0.274) (0.325)
Localism -5.538* -1.049 -1.844* -0.118
(3.269) (1.391) (0.95) (0.89)
Confidence 2.323** 0.894 0.646 0.079
(0.935) (0.627) (0.405) (0.471)
Female 1.057 0.896 0.558 -0.627
(0.849) (0.561) (0.417) (0.646)
Entry Age -0.164*** -0.115*** -0.133*** -0.070***
(0.041) (0.026) (0.017) (0.019)
Oxbridge 1.326*** 0.484 0.593*** 0.155
(0.466) (0.325) (0.204) (0.252)
Politico 0.421 0.808* 0.556* 1.012***
(0.704) (0.479) (0.336) (0.353)
Labour 0.816* 0.637** 0.138 -0.206
(0.464) (0.322) (0.203) (0.243)
Entry Date 0.023** 0.000 0.005 0.012**
(0.009) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005)
Term Length -0.001* -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.001) (0) (0) (0)
Constant -1.479 1.495 3.752*** 1.240
(2.171) (1.486) (0.959) (1.105)
Notes: The reference category is backbench MPs who are never selected for higher
office. The multinomial logit was estimated using a Vector Generalized Linear Model
(Yee, 2015). N=847. Significance stars: ∗∗∗p < .01; ∗∗p < .05; ∗p < .1.
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Substantive effects for multinomial models are particularly difficult to interpret,
since they depend not only on a single vector of coefficients for each category, but
also on the coefficients from the other categories, and so further discussion of speech
effects are given in reference to Figure 4.3. The graphs show first differences, defined
as the difference in simulated distributions of predicted probabilities between the 75th
and 25th percentiles of each speech measure. For each graph, a vertical line bisects 0
on the x-axis, denoting no change in probability of the event from the 25th percentile
to the 75th. Distributions above the line show a positive effect on the probability of
selection to the given category, while distributions below the line show a negative
effect.
The findings show a remarkable range of probability distributions for different roles.
For example, increased participation makes a backbench career around 10 percentage
points less likely, whilst increasing the likelihood of becoming an undersecretary by
around 8 percentage points. Participation also has no effect on becoming a whip
(H1b) and only a small effect on becoming a cabinet minister (though becoming a
cabinet minister from the backbench is a relatively rare event with few data points).
Specialisation has little decisive effect (I therefore find no evidence to support H2b).
Taking a local focus in speeches sees MPs more likely to remain backbenchers, and
much less likely to take a position as a parliamentary undersecretary (providing support
for H3b). Finally, confident language shows a very similar profile to participation
(though with roughly half the effect size), making backbench positions less likely, and
executive positions more so (providing support for H4b).
In summarising the multinomial analysis, it appears that speechmaking has
an effect because of its particular relevance to competences required of different
frontbench roles, rather than simply being a function of party preferment. If increased
speechmaking is simply indicative of being ‘closer’ to, or more trusted by the party
leadership, the role of the whip should be affected in the same way by speechmaking
as are other frontbench appointments. The finding that those who are appointed to
be whips are average performers in speech suggests that speechmaking in parliament
is a skill that is acknowledged by party leaders when allocating first promotions to




























First differences moving from 25th to 






























First differences moving from 25th to 






























First differences moving from 25th to 






























First differences moving from 25th to 




Figure 4.3: First differences for categories of ministerial selection
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positions, while average speakers are more likely to be appointed as whips, perhaps
making use of other organisational or interpersonal skills.
4.2.6 C: Time to First Promotion
Table 4.4: Cox Proportional Hazards Models of Time to Promotion









Female 0.351 0.353 0.308 0.310 0.319
(0.230) (0.230) (0.230) (0.230) (0.230)
Entry Age −0.068∗∗∗ −0.069∗∗∗ −0.074∗∗∗ −0.071∗∗∗ −0.071∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Oxbridge 0.359∗∗∗ 0.369∗∗∗ 0.342∗∗∗ 0.356∗∗∗ 0.306∗∗∗
(0.110) (0.110) (0.110) (0.110) (0.111)
Politico 0.472∗∗∗ 0.462∗∗∗ 0.453∗∗∗ 0.453∗∗∗ 0.468∗∗∗
(0.155) (0.154) (0.154) (0.154) (0.154)
Labour 0.044 0.092 0.121 0.173 0.099
(0.111) (0.110) (0.109) (0.111) (0.113)
Entry Date 0.0001∗∗∗ 0.0001∗∗∗ 0.0001∗∗∗ 0.0001∗∗∗ 0.0001∗∗∗
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00002)
Term Length −0.0004∗∗∗ −0.0002∗∗ −0.0003∗∗∗ −0.0002∗ −0.0004∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
N 847 847 847 847 847
R2 0.142 0.134 0.138 0.134 0.151
Log Likelihood −2,453.895 −2,457.700 −2,455.814 −2,457.799 −2,449.194
Notes: Raw coefficients are displayed. Take the exponent of each coefficient to give
the marginal effect on hazard ratio. For example, a one unit increase in Participation
(1000 words) increases the hazard ratio of promotion to higher office by e0.005 ≈ 1.005
or an increase of 0.5%. Significance stars: ∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Finally, the analysis turns to the estimation of how long MPs wait after their
first term to be selected into a frontbench position. Table 4.4 gives the results of
Cox proportional hazards regressions in a similar manner to Table 4.2, measuring
individual speech effects with a fully specified model at the end. Regarding the
parliamentary speech variables, we again see similar results to the logit models, with
the significant and expected direction of effects (H1c, H2c, H3c, H4c), but dominated
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by the effect of participation (H1c) in the fully specified Model 5. To gain a better
understanding of the interpretation of these abstract continuous speech measures,
Figure 4.4 displays the change in the hazard ratio of ministerial selection from the
minimum to the maximum values of the speech variables (taken from Table 4.4, Model
5), holding other variables at their means. The horizontal line fixed at 1 shows the
baseline hazard. The ribbons show the 95% confidence intervals at each level of the
x-axis. Significant increases to the hazard rate result from high levels of participation
(H1c). Increases in confident language (H4c) also show increases in the hazard ratio,
though when specified in Table 4.4, Model 5, estimates become unreliable (z-score
= 1.87). Similarly, as expected, the hazard ratio declines with increased local focus
(H3c) but here too, the estimate is unreliable (z-score = -1.838). Finally, Model 5
finds little to no evidence for the impact of specialisation (H2c) on the hazard ratio.
In summary, the results from the Cox regression corroborate the findings from the
logistic regression and give weight to the finding that debate participation is strongly
associated with career progression. They also suggest some support for H2c, H3c and
H4c but, similarly to the logistic regression models, these measures are unreliable
when included in a model with participation.
The coefficient for the control variable ‘Entry Date’ indicates that the waiting
time among new MPs for a first promotion has indeed reduced significantly over time
(corroborating the findings of Cowley (2012)). Whether this is explained by shorter
screening times, or simply an increase in the supply in ministerial positions (which
has certainly been the case for the opposition) is, however, unclear from the present
analysis. For the background explanatory variables, there is a similar interpretation
to the logit models, with a clear preference towards promoting younger, educated
and politically experienced candidates before other MPs. Taking the exponent of the
Oxbridge coefficient in model 5, the marginal effect of attendance increases the hazard
by 36%, while having prior professional political experience increases the hazard by
59%. The marginal effect of entering parliament one year older decreases the hazard
by 7%, suggesting that youth is particularly critical for those MPs who enter the
House without immediate prospects of selection, since entering at an older age both

















































Figure 4.4: Marginal effects of patterns of speechmaking on hazard ratio (promotion
to the frontbench)
in line with other results, women do not experience significantly different waiting
times to men.
4.3 Conclusion
This Chapter has demonstrated that parliamentary speechmaking has strong asso-
ciations with promotion to the frontbench among early career MPs. This general
finding complements previous findings of the effect of parliamentary behaviour (in the
form of legislative voting) and career progression in the British House of Commons
(Piper, 1991). In particular, the higher the participation in parliamentary debate, the
greater the likelihood is that an individual will be selected into ministerial positions,
which require good oratory skills in order to promote or defend party policy to the
House. This central finding is accompanied by results suggesting that the content of
speeches may also have an important role to play in career progression, though based
on the evidence above, the relationships may be too complicated to be captured by
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the simple text measures developed here.
Crucially, the results show that parliamentary debate only affects the likelihood of
promotion to positions that require strong skills in parliamentary rhetoric. I find no
evidence to suggest that any speech-based measure has a statistical association with
appointment to the role of whip, a position with no requirement for parliamentary
speech. This finding is important because it demonstrates the potential for a causal
relationship between speechmaking and ministerial selection. It suggests that party
leaders are allocating promotions, not simply on the basis that participation in
debate shows general competence or commitment, but also because participation in
parliamentary debate is particularly appropriate for ministers, but less important for
whips.
An important implication of this study is that in analysing the actions of early
career politicians in the legislature, we uncover a deeper understanding of how
ambitious politicians approach political life, and political representation in general.
Searing’s ministerial aspirants were anxious to spend as much time in Westminster
as possible, in order to network, to be seen and to prove their value (Searing, 1994).
As this study shows, MPs who are eventually promoted to the ministerial ranks are
spending more of their first terms debating in the chamber than their peers, and
possibly also downplaying the significance of local representation in their parliamentary
activity.
Furthermore, this relative focus on Westminster on the part of ambitious MP’s
provides a colourful example of the micro-processes of power delegation in the
Westminster system (Strøm et al., 2003). Once elected to parliament, parties must
delegate to increasingly smaller circles of national executive power. The behaviour
of successfully promoted politicians demonstrated here resonates with the focus on
centralisation, parliamentary activity and national (rather than local) policy agendas
that are required for successful power delegation following a general election to the
appointment of government.
This research also makes a contribution to the growing literature making use
of parliamentary speech for the measurement of non-ideological latent dimensions
(Killermann and Proksch, 2013; Proksch and Slapin, 2015; Kellermann, 2016). The
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finding that parliamentary debate may also reflect the underlying politics behind
political appointments gives further credence to the use of parliamentary debate as a
means by which to measure meaningful parliamentary behaviour.
Finally, this Chapter opens the possibility for further study into the implications
of political ambition and career progression in parliamentary democracy. Further
studies may combine speechmaking with other important determinants of career
progression such as electoral majority (in single-member district systems), ideology
and parliamentary voting. Future studies may also refine the use of text analysis in
order to better capture the latent dimensions discussed in this chapter, or to theorise
entirely new measures. In closing, the study of the behavioural consequences of
ambition in parliamentary democracy has the potential to explain much about the





Could Rainfall have Swung
the Result of the Brexit
Referendum?
with Barıs¸ Arı
Torrential rainfall on the day of the Brexit referendum severely affected parts of the
United Kingdom, particularly South East England, London and Northern Ireland.
The Met Office issued an amber warning and the London Fire Brigade reported that
it had responded to more than 400 incidents, including rescuing residents by boats
(London Fire Brigade, 2016). The BBC published images of water “up to six inches
deep” at polling stations (BBC News, 2016a) as reports emerged throughout the
day that several referendum polling stations had closed because of flooding (Smith,
2016) and that rainfall had caused severe damage to property in the Kent districts of
Canterbury, Swale and Thanet (ESWD, 2017). As a result of extensive rail disruption,
thousands of commuters were stuck at central train stations across London before
the polls were closed. Most notably, Waterloo train station in London, which serves
up to 250,000 passengers per day, was closed after rainfall threw services into chaos
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(Tran, 2016). The severity of rain on polling day caused media reports to question
whether the weather could affect the turnout of the referendum (Knapton, 2016;
Aron, 2016). Following press speculation and several studies of the electoral effects of
rainfall,1 we address the question: could rainfall have changed the result of the UK’s
EU referendum?
In this study we use fine-grained radar data on rainfall between 6 am and 10 pm
on 23rd June 2016, a measurement window that allows us to measure the effect of
rainfall just before and during voting hours (7 am to 10 pm). Rainfall was highly
variable across the UK with much of the day’s rain concentrated around London
the South-East, Northern Ireland and parts of western Scotland, all areas which
predominantly supported remain. The district of Hartsmere, some 15 miles north
of London, experienced the heaviest downpour with 22 mm of rain over the 16 hour
period, nearly half the total expected rainfall in June of around 50 mm (Met Office,
2016).2
The distribution of rainfall on polling day warrants proper investigation of the
intriguing question posed originally by media commentary, but also poses sizeable
challenges to estimate the effect of rainfall at the district level and to assess its effect
on the referendum result itself. We employ techniques developed to accurately model
compositional electoral data (Tomz et al., 2002). We leverage recent innovations in
statistical analysis (Fong et al., 2017; Imai and Ratkovic, 2014) to improve balance
on pretreatment covariates – a problem caused by the lopsided distribution of rainfall.
We also use post-estimation techniques that allow us to determine the effect of rainfall
on vote share through both differential turnout and by the recently defined ‘vote-shift’
channel (Horiuchi and Kang, 2017), by which rainfall causes undecided voters to
change their mind through its effect on mood.
Our findings suggest that rainfall had a statistically significant but substantively
inconsequential effect on the referendum. Our estimated rainfall effect is slightly in
excess of existing estimations in the literature. More interestingly, we find that rainfall
1See Gomez et al. (2007), Persson et al. (2014), Eisinga et al. (2011), Knack (1994), Horiuchi
and Kang (2017), Bassi and Williams (2017), Fraga and Hersh (2011), and Gatrell and Bierly (2002)
2Rainfall over the 24 hour period showed even greater extremes, with 50 mm (roughly 2 inches)
or more experienced by 8 London Boroughs.
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affected the leave vote more acutely than remain. This result refutes the conventional
wisdom that leave supporters were more committed than remain supporters. Indeed,
Nigel Farage – UK Independence Party (Ukip) leader and persistent campaigner
to leave the EU – claimed that his voters would “crawl over broken glass” to vote
for Brexit (BBC News, 2016b). Despite this, we find that a counterfactual election
day in which no rain fell would have produced a slightly altered but much the same
substantive result – a win for Vote Leave by a margin exceeding 1 million votes.
5.1 Rainfall, Elections and the EU Referendum
Rainfall is among a set of variables commonly believed to affect the propensity to
vote through its impact on the cost of voting as described in the rational voter
model (Merrifield, 1993; Downs, 1957; Riker and Ordeshook, 1968). Accordingly,
dedicated studies of rainfall and elections generally find a negative effect on turnout,
but the extent to which rainfall substantively changes election results is far less certain.
Eisinga et al. (2011) measure the effect of rainfall in the Dutch context between
1971-2010 and find that 25 mm of rainfall is indicative of a 1.02% percentage point
decrease in the level of voter turnout. In the case of the United states, Gomez et al.
(2007) find that an inch of rainfall decreases turnout by 0.98%, Horiuchi and Kang
find a turnout decrease of 1.16% for every inch of rainfall and Gatrell and Bierly
(2002) find that rainfall depressed turnout in Kentucky Primary elections. However,
Persson et al. (2014) integrate the posited costs of high rainfall into the rational voter
model and find that rainfall had no substantive negative effect on turnout in Swedish
elections between 1976-2010.
The discrepancy in findings is likely due to a number of factors, notwithstanding
considerable variation in data collection and measurement. Firstly, voter characteris-
tics may contribute to heterogenous treatment effects. Studies of differential turnout
argue that differences in voter commitment between US political parties condition
how damaging rainfall is to voter turnout in each political group (Gomez et al., 2007;
Horiuchi and Kang, 2017). According to Gomez et al., “bad weather may be the last
straw for peripheral voters, and according to the conventional wisdom, these voters
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may be disproportionately inclined to support the Democratic presidential candidate”
(Gomez et al., 2007, p. 658). Similarly, Knack (1994) finds that the negative effect of
rainfall on turnout is limited to voters with low levels of civic duty, contributing to
the expectation that parties relying on such voters in greater numbers will be more
susceptible to the effect of inclement weather.
Secondly, electoral systems and circumstances appear to matter. Where systems
are proportional and political participation is high (Persson et al., 2014), the cost
of voting is lower than in other systems, since all votes count equally towards the
total. In such cases, voters are less likely to conclude that the discomfort caused by a
walk in the rain is futile. In single member district systems, voters may only feel the
same level of motivation in districts where the election race is considered close (Fraga
and Hersh, 2011; Shachar and Nalebuff, 1999), diminishing the effect of rainfall in
marginal districts. Thus, in typical single member district elections, rainfall may
have a significant effect on vote share in safe districts without affecting the results for
tightly contested seats.
Recently, researchers have extended the analysis of weather events beyond the
differential turnout hypothesis to suggest that rainfall may also systematically affect
the vote choice of undecided and moderate voters (Bassi and Williams, 2017; Horiuchi
and Kang, 2017). The conjecture is that inclement weather affects mood, which
according to the predictions of prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 2013) affects
risk aversion, resulting in a vote-shift towards candidates seen as the least risky option.
Where political options are considered distinct in terms of risk – as is the case in the
USA where Democrat candidates are considered the riskier option (Kam and Simas,
2010) – estimates of a vote-shift channel of the rainfall effect are estimated to account
for at least two thirds of the Republican rainfall advantage (Kam and Simas, 2010).
The literature on euroscepticism in Britain provides important information on
the demographic structure and political motivation on the Vote Leave campaign, and
so sheds light on expectations for differential turnout. On the one hand, the EU
referendum provided the British electorate a vote on an issue substantially different
from general elections. Some reports suggested that Vote Leave may have stood to
profit from decreased turnout, since it was claimed that Brexiteers had arguably
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more strongly held beliefs vis-a-vis the European Union and would therefore be
more enthused about the prospect of voting (Twyman, 2016; Dunford and Kirk,
2016). Some of this dedication was reflected in the reportage of the referendum
itself, with pro-leave voters urging each other to mark ballots with pen instead of the
pencils provided in the belief that corrupt election officials would attempt to re-assign
pencil marked ballots (Griffin, 2016). If, as discourse suggests, pro-leave voters were
more dedicated to their cause, then adverse weather conditions may have given an
advantage to the Vote Leave campaign.
However Ford and Goodwin (2014, p. 152) note that the demographic support
for Ukip (the pro-Brexit party) is “anchored in a clear social base: older blue-collar
voters, citizens with few qualifications, whites and men”. Low education and social
class are typically associated with reduced political engagement in Britain (Hansard
Society, 2017) and in other advanced industrial economies (Lijphart, 1997; Gallego,
2010; Kasara and Suryanarayan, 2015), but were strong predictors of Brexit support
in the lead-in to the referendum (Twyman, 2016). Studies have shown that once
people have become accustomed to voting regularly, they are less likely to be deterred
by factors such as rainfall impacting upon their decision to vote (Aldrich et al., 2011;
Gerber et al., 2003). The relative lack of voting habit among important demographics
of the pro-Brexit support shows a greater susceptibility of the leave vote to differential
turnout in rainy conditions.
Another factor which may indicate a negative effect of rainfall on differential
turnout is that older and poorer voters are potentially more likely to be physically
deterred by poor weather for reasons of safety or reliance on public transport or
walking (Knack, 1994; Eisinga et al., 2011; Gomez et al., 2007, p. 191), though there
is little conclusive evidence for this in statistical analysis. Nevertheless, the theoretical
expectation remains that the preponderance of older voters in the pro-Brexit camp
could have lead to a differential turnout caused by a deterrent effect of rainfall on the
elderly.
With regard to vote-shift (where marginal voters change their vote choice due to
rainfall), the expected direction of effect is clear. Remain, as the least risky status quo
option (Harries, 2016; Clarke et al., 2017, p. 4), should have a significant advantage
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over undecided voters in rainy conditions (Bassi and Williams, 2017; Horiuchi and
Kang, 2017). This expectation is magnified by the parallel expectation that the high
issue salience of the referendum should have reduced the effect of rainfall on turnout
(Persson et al., 2014). The combination of these expectations is that rainfall may
affect the vote share of leave and remain more than it affects turnout. In such a
situation, differential turnout cannot account for the entire effect of rainfall on vote
share and therefore vote-shift must logically account for some of the difference. In this
case we expect vote-shift to benefit the remain vote share – i.e. we expect marginal
voters to switch their vote choice from leave to remain because of the poor weather.
We form three hypotheses linking rainfall to the UK’s EU referendum result. Our
first hypothesis follows the literature on rainfall and elections (H1: rainfall reduces
referendum turnout).
Our theoretical expectations for vote share are split into two subcategories:
differential turnout and vote-shift. Theoretical expectations of the effect of rainfall
on differential turnout are in conflict – on the one hand, media commentary on the
referendum indicated that issue salience and voter commitment was stronger among
leave supporters (H2a: rainfall reduces the remain vote more acutely than the leave
vote). On the other hand remain supporters were more likely to have formed voting
habits, and were less likely to be physically deterred from voting by rainfall. We
therefore set a competing hypothesis (H2b: rainfall reduces the leave vote more
acutely than the remain vote).
Conversely, our theoretical expectation for the vote-shift channel is clear, as
choosing to remain in the EU was considered the least risky option (H3: rainfall
causes voters to change vote choice from leave to remain).
5.2 Analysis
In the following section, we describe the data collection process and discuss balancing
on pre-treatment covariates. We start our estimation using OLS on turnout and leave
share separately. Next, we run Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) models on
compositional electoral data. These models allow us to estimate the impact of rainfall
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on both turnout and vote share jointly. Based on these latter estimates, we then
estimate the counterfactual referendum result on a day without rainfall, the extent
to which the rainfall effect was caused by differential turnout or vote-shift, and the
effect of postal voting on the rainfall effect. We conclude with a brief application
to election forecasting, showing that the inclusion of rainfall significantly reduces
forecasting errors of leave share in the EU Referendum.
5.2.1 Data
Figure 5.1: Rainfall between 06:00 am and 10:00 pm on 23 June 2016 using radar measure-
ments and referendum counting districts
Our measurement of rainfall on 23 June 2016 relies on data from the Met Office’s
NIMROD System (Met Office, 2003; Thomas, 2015). The NIMROD System collects
radar data for rainfall every five minutes at a resolution of 1 km2. We then transformed
the radar data to Environmental Systems Research Institute (ESRI) ASCII raster
format. In order to measure rainfall for the voting period, we limited the time period
from 6 am and 10 pm (official voting hours were between 7 am and 10 pm), yielding
192 separate raster images extracted from the NIMROD radar data, which were
then summed up to provide accurate measurements of rainfall within the period 6
am-10 pm. We also measured rainfall for the period 12 midnight to 10pm.3 The
vector polygons for referendum districts (seen in Figure 5.1) are taken from ESRI.
3alternative model estimations using the longer time window are included in the Appendix.
Results do not substantively change our key findings.
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These polygons did not originally include district level divisions for Northern Ireland
(nor indeed did the official election results according to the Electoral Commission).
However, we were able to identify voting districts in Northern Ireland by constituency,
as the BBC’s Referendum coverage (BBC News, 2016c) included a constituency level
breakdown of Northern Irish results. We took the BBC’s Northern Ireland results and
then georeferenced them to polygons for each of Northern Ireland’s parliamentary
constituencies, adding these polygons to our data.
The referendum results data were available from the Electoral Commission (2017).
As discussed above, additional results were taken from the BBC referendum results
website. Majority remain areas were grouped around London and other significant
urban areas such as Liverpool and Manchester. Scotland and Northern Ireland also
voted in opposition to England and Wales with majority remain results for both
nations. The majority of leave votes were spread through rural and suburban Britain.
Two counting districts, Shetland and Orkney (pop. 45,000) and Gibraltar (pop.
32,000) were dropped from the analysis due to the lack of available rainfall data -
both voted heavily in favour of remain. This is unlikely to affect the overall conclusion
due to the small population size of both districts.
Figure 5.2: Turnout in the 2015 General Election (left) and the 2016 EU Referendum
(right).
We then collected data for a number of covariates to create predictive models
of turnout and vote-share. First, we created a measure of political engagement by
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including turnout from the previous General Election of 2015 (Figure 5.2, left). Due
to the fact that the counting areas of the EU referendum and constituency boundaries
of the 2015 general election do not correspond to one another, we adopted a zonal
statistics approach to transform the 2015 election data to the referendum units. First,
we transformed vector data for the 2015 elections to raster data. Then, we overlaid
the referendum polygons onto this raster and used zonal statistics to calculate an
average value for turnout in each referendum district. This solution was not necessary
for Northern Ireland as the referendum polygons and 2015 parliamentary election
constituencies are the same. We used the election data directly from the Electoral
Commission for Northern Ireland. Figure 5.2 shows the levels of turnout in the 2015
general election and the EU referendum (national levels of turnout are 66.1% and
72.2% respectively). At the district level, the two are positively correlated (0.68
Spearman correlation).
The vote share of Ukip in the 2014 European Parliamentary elections was also
included (Electoral Commission, 2017) as a measure of underlying support for the
leave vote. Due to Northern Ireland electing MEPs via a Single Transferable Vote
system, electoral results report a single district for the whole of Northern Ireland
(3.9%). In order to avoid under-reporting variance for the region, we allowed this vote
share to vary by generating a truncated normal distribution with a minimum of zero,
and a maximum value equal to the maximum value for Ukip vote share in Scotland,
whose overall reported vote share was similar. We iterated this distribution until the
expected value for the Ukip vote share in Northern Ireland fell between 3.9%-3.95%.
We also included demographic variables from census data and official labour market
statistics sources (Nomis, 2011; DfE, 2015) and from the Northern Ireland Statistics
and Research Agency. Five demographic variables were collected including median
age, gender balance, the percentage of residents with a first degree or equivalent,
logged population density, and the percentage of residents with lower social grade. 4
Finally, we collected data measuring the level of postal voting during the referendum
in order to test an ancillary hypothesis about the possible mediating influence of
postal votes on the rainfall effect.
4Grades D and E, according to the classification of the Office for National Statistics (ONS, 2011)
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5.2.2 Balancing on Pre-Treatment Covariates
One of the challenges to estimating the average treatment effect (ATE) from the
data collected is the pre-treatment imbalance caused by the geographical distribution
of rainfall across the country on polling day. As Figure 5.1 makes clear, rainfall
was largely confined to the south eastern part of England, as well as the majority
of Northern Ireland. This is an issue for inference because the correlation between
rainfall and other important covariates could bias our estimates. Column 3 of Table
5.1 illustrates this issue. Rainfall has strong associations with median age, population
density and social grade, indicating that rain fell more often on younger, poorer and
more urbanised districts. In order to correct for this imbalance, we use non-parametric
Covariate Balancing Generalised Propensity Scores (npCBGPS), developed as a means
to solve imbalance problems with continuous treatment (Fong et al., 2017). The
method works by varying observation weights in order to minimize the association
between the treatment (rainfall) and other covariates.
When applied to the EU Referendum data, we are able to reduce the Pearson
correlation association between treatment and covariates substantially, with a mean
absolute Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.03. A common strategy to further improve
balance is to progressively prune observations contributing most to imbalance (Ho
et al., 2007; King et al., 2017). When applying this method to the present data by
progressively deleting observations with the smallest weights, we found that imbalance
increased, contrary to our expectation. We therefore did not seek to further improve
balance on our selected treatment.5. Once found, balancing weights are integrated
into our statistical analysis with weighted least squares (WLS) regression in the
first instance, and then into the SUR by multiplying both the dependent variable
Y and the covariate matrix X = (1, X1 . . . Xk) by W
1/2 (the square root of the
diagonalised matrix of observational weights) to allow for estimation of the WLS
estimator (XTWX)−1XTWY within the SUR framework.
5This finding is not a universal property of npCBGPS weights, as we found pruning improved
balance with other treatment specifications
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Table 5.1: Summary statistics and measures of pre-treatment covariate balance.









Turnout (%) 73.214 5.521 0.032 −
Leave (%) 52.717 10.629 -0.131 −
Remain (%) 47.283 10.629 0.131 −
Treatment
Rain 6am-10pm (mm) 3.841 4.983 1 1
Covariates
Turnout 2015 GE (%) 67.136 4.852 −0.076 −0.014
UKIP 2014 EP (%) 28.029 10.600 −0.039 −0.007
Median Age 40.440 4.282 −0.220 −0.039
Women (%) 50.913 0.738 −0.082 −0.014
Low Social Grade (%) 25.102 6.961 −0.287 −0.054
Higher Education (%) 26.768 7.604 0.241 0.045
$ln$(Pop. Density) 1.701 1.491 0.184 0.033
Postal Votes (%) 21.175 6.292 −0.213 −0.036
England 0.819 0.385 0.143 0.027
Note: Column 3 shows Pearson correlations between rainfall and controlling covariates. Column 4
shows Pearson correlations after weighting observations with npCBGPS weights (Fong et al., 2017).
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5.2.3 OLS and WLS estimates
We first present conventional OLS estimates of the effect of rainfall on the turnout
and vote share of the EU Referendum. Unlike SUR, OLS models estimate turnout
and vote-share separately, as if these two are independent. Although this assumption
is clearly wrong, we nevertheless start with OLS and WLS because these models are
simple to interpret.6
Table 5.2 shows the results from estimations of the turnout, and leave vote share.
We adopt two modelling strategies for each dependent variable. Models 1 and 3
estimate ordinary least squares with country-level fixed effects, while Models 2 and
4 estimate weighted least squares (WLS) using the npCBGPS observation weights
described above. We find that the models perform similarly to each other in the
estimation of the effect of rainfall. When predicting turnout, both Models 1 and 2
find a statistically significant effect (in support of H1), with Model 2 estimating the
larger of the coefficients. Models 3 or 4 find negative rainfall effects on vote share,
though only Model 4 is significant, therefore only tentative conclusions can be drawn
from OLS estimates on the association between rainfall and vote share.
Turning to the effects of covariates, support for Ukip in the 2014 European
Parliament elections significantly increased leave vote share, but also increased
turnout, consistent with reports of differential issue saliency between campaigns
(Dunford and Kirk, 2016; Griffin, 2016; Twyman, 2016). This finding is accompanied
by the similar coefficients of median age and the England dummy variable in Models
2 and 4. These both show, as is now well known, that support for the referendum
and support for the Brexit option was higher among older English voters. These
coefficients are mirrored in 2015 General Election turnout and Higher Education,
both of which increase turnout but decrease leave vote share.
6The OLS and WLS marginal effects are directly interpretable from the estimated coefficients,
while the SUR models we later present require logarithmic transformation and visualization.
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Table 5.2: OLS estimates of UK EU Referendum turnout and vote share.
Turnout (%) Leave (%)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Rain 6am-10pm (mm) −0.05∗ −0.06∗∗ −0.05 −0.09∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04)
Turnout 2015 GE (%) 0.40∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ −0.35∗∗∗ −0.38∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.06)
UKIP 2014 EP (%) 0.14∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04)
Women (%) −0.02 0.08 −1.34∗∗∗ −1.37∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.16) (0.34) (0.34)
Low Social Grade (%) −0.33∗∗∗ −0.37∗∗∗ −0.28∗∗∗ −0.32∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.06)
ln(Pop. Density) −0.51∗∗∗ −0.52∗∗∗ 0.14 0.68∗∗
(0.11) (0.11) (0.24) (0.23)
Higher Education (%) 0.03 0.05 −0.94∗∗∗ −0.92∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.06)
Median Age 0.18∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.09) (0.09)
England 1.96∗∗∗ 4.39∗∗∗
(0.42) (0.91)
Constant 44.98∗∗∗ 45.88∗∗∗ 149.99∗∗∗ 141.29∗∗∗
(6.99) (7.38) (15.64) (16.14)
Fixed Effects 3 3
npCBGPS Weights 3 3
R2 0.91 0.90 0.87 0.87
Adj. R2 0.90 0.89 0.87 0.87
Num. obs. 398 398 398 398
RMSE 1.71 0.09 3.82 0.20
Note: Significance stars at ∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05. Models 1 and 3 include country
level fixed effects (England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland), while Models 2 and 4 include
npCBGPS weights to correct for imbalance across the dataset including whether or not a district is
located in England. Instead of country-level fixed effects, WLS models include a dummy variable
indicating whether the electoral area is England or not. This is done because Scotland, Wales
and Northern Ireland contain too few districts to achieve acceptable balance without dropping
observations.
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5.2.4 Compositional Analysis with Seemingly Unrelated
Regression
Next, we follow Tomz et al. (2002) and Horiuchi and Kang (2017) in estimating two
regression equations simultaneously via SUR. The estimation technique solves two
problems with the single equation estimation. The first problem, inherent in all uses
of OLS to estimate compositional data (data in which outcomes are expressed as
proportions adding up to 1), is that OLS could predict a turnout of above 100%. The
second problem, as indicated previously, is that single equation regressions cannot
estimate all three election results (remain, leave and the rate of abstention) at once,
leading one to make inferences over a single outcome (leave vote share), ignoring
the fact that an effect on one outcome (turnout) automatically affects another. This
makes analysis over phenomena such as differential turnout all but impossible. The
method applied here corrects both problems through the use of the multinomial
logistic transformation and SUR.
Instead of estimating single outcomes, the method estimates logged ratios of
election outcomes relative to a baseline outcome. In this case both leave and remain
(measured as the percentage relative to the electorate of each district) are expressed as













We then estimate these dependent variables simultaneously in a system of two
regression equations using SUR. When evaluating this model, we recover predicted
values by applying the inverse logistic function in terms of percent leave (Lˆ), percent
remain (Rˆ) and percent abstain (Aˆ).7
Lˆ =
eLA
1 + eLA + eRA
; Rˆ =
eRA
1 + eLA + eRA
; Aˆ =
1
1 + eLA + eRA
(5.2)
Table 5.3 shows the results of Models 5 and 6 in reduced form.8. Model 5 shows a
7In all cases Lˆi + Rˆi + Aˆi = 1.
8Full regression tables provided in the Appendix
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Table 5.3: SUR estimates of logged ratio Referendum results.
Model 5 Model 6
RA LA RA LA
Rain 6 am-10 pm (mm) −0.0027∗ −0.0046∗∗ −0.0030∗∗ −0.0066∗∗∗
(.0012) (0.0016) (0.0011) (0.0015)
Controls 3 3 3 3
npCBPS Weights 3 3
Fixed Effects 3 3
R2 0.91 0.89 0.91 0.87
Adj. R2 0.90 0.88 0.90 0.87
RMSE 0.10 0.13 0.01 0.01
Num. obs. 398 398 398 398
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Note: Significance stars at ∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05. Models 5 and 6 show summarised
results from simultaneous estimations of leave share and remain share relative to the rate of abstention
(see Equation 5.1).
fixed effects model in an analogous configuration to Models 1 and 3, while Model 6
gives estimates of SUR regression with balancing weights. Both models find statistical
significance for the effect of rainfall, though Model 6 suggests a greater magnitude of
effect.
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We display meaningful interpretation of Model 6 in Figure 5.3. Here we take
predicted first differences of a change in rainfall from 0 mm rainfall to 25 mm
(approximately 1 inch) between 6 am and 10 pm. We simulate 1,000 coefficient vectors
according to a multivariate normal distribution with means set at the coefficient point
estimates and sigma set to the variance-covariance matrix of the coefficients. We then
multiply the simulated coefficients with rainfall set to 25 mm and then with rainfall
set to 0 mm (all other X values are set at their respective means) and subtract one
from the other. We display the means of these distributions as point estimates and























Figure 5.3: First difference estimates of referendum results from Model 6 at the
district level according to a 25 mm increase in rainfall
A first difference of 25 mm rainfall is above the maximum value of rainfall in the
time period measured, but we estimate it to compare with estimates of the rainfall
effect from the literature (Gomez et al., 2007; Eisinga et al., 2011; Horiuchi and
Kang, 2017). We find a relatively high effect on turnout with approximately 1 inch
of rainfall equating to a 2.45% rise in the rate of abstention compared with roughly
1% elsewhere. However, these estimates are not directly comparable because of the
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fact that we are able to restrict out measurements to actual voting hours (a 16 hour
window) whereas previous studies had to rely on full 24 hour measurements, including
rainfall after the polls had closed. We can make a simple adjustment to our estimate
by multiplying our estimate by 2/3 (since 16 hours is two-thirds of a full day), giving
a 1.6% effect on turnout. This figure is still high but close to the standard findings in
the literature. Figure 5.3 also shows that rainfall, perhaps surprisingly, affected the
leave vote share more than the remain vote share. An increase in rainfall of 25 mm
shows a significant decline in the leave vote (-2.89%), while the change to the remain
share is smaller (0.44%) and statistically insignificant at the 95% level.
Differential Turnout or Vote-Shift? Decomposition of the Rainfall Effect
According to recent research connecting psychology with electoral studies (Horiuchi
and Kang, 2017; Bassi and Williams, 2017; Meier et al., 2016), poor weather may
impact on voting patterns in different ways. Conventional thought has it that rainfall
affects elections by deterring supporters of one party more than it does another, but
compositional analysis of elections shows that this cannot always be the case. Under
certain conditions, at least some proportion of the rainfall effect must come through
a vote-shift channel, where according to theory, adverse weather conditions cause
undecided voters to become temporarily more risk-averse, thus voting for the least
risky candidate.
Regarding the EU referendum, our theoretical expectations were split into two
parts. Under differential turnout, predictions for the direction of effect were compli-
cated by conflicting arguments about voter commitment. We show in Figure 5.3 that
the effect of rainfall on remain vote share was insignificant (allowing us to reject H2a),
while the effect on leave vote share was negative and significant (supporting H2b).
Under vote-shift, we hypothesised that the remain result would benefit because it
represented the status quo option (H3).
In order to explore how much of the remain advantage was due to either differential
turnout (H2b) or vote-shift H3, we must rely on calculating the upper and lower
bounds of the vote-shift channel, since it is not possible to report this precisely from
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the regression model.9 First, we find the theoretical upper and lower bounds of the
vote-shift channel using the first differences calculated from Model 6:
U.B. = ∆Rˆ(0.44)−∆Lˆ(−2.89) = 3.33 (5.3)
L.B. = U.B(3.33)−∆Aˆ(2.45) = 0.88 (5.4)
Where the upper bound is the entire remain advantage, and the lower bound
subtracts ∆Aˆ from the upper bound. Under conditions in which the U.B. (remain
advantage) > ∆Aˆ, the vote-shift channel must account for some proportion of vote
share advantage, since the decrease in turnout is not enough to explain the entire
remain advantage. However, where U.B. (remain advantage) < ∆Aˆ, differential
turnout may explain all of the difference in vote share, meaning that the existence of
a vote-shift channel cannot be confirmed. According to Model 6, the lower bound is
above zero and we therefore find that the explanation for the remain advantage was
mixed. At least 26% of the remain rainfall advantage was due to vote-shift (voters
choosing to change vote due to inclement weather).
We also find evidence to suggest that differential turnout (H2b) could have been
driven by factors identified in our theoretical discussion: social class and age. We run
three interactive models (full results in the Appendix) showing that the interactions of
rainfall with age and social class had a stronger effect for Brexit supporters, suggesting
that rain may have had the effect of physically deterring older and poorer voters.
Voting habit (turnout in the previous General Election) also impacted the rainfall
effect on turnout but these effects were evenly spread between leave and remain voters.
This leads us to conclude that a likely contributor to differential vote share in the
EU Referendum was a deterrent effect of rainfall upon older and poorer voters.
Since our chosen method of measuring rainfall in Model 6 is more or less conven-
tional, we recognise that there could be better ways to test for the existence of a
vote-shift channel. Since vote-shift is said to occur via a psychological mechanism, it
may be more effective to measure rainfall in terms of length of exposure, rather than
9See Horiuchi and Kang (2017) for thorough explanation of the method
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measured amounts. Measurement in millimetres could easily equate a typical rainy
day with an otherwise sunny day punctuated by a rainstorm, while the psychological
effects of these alternatives could be very different. Motivated by measurements in
Bassi and Williams (2017), we test an alternative aggregation of the radar data by
calculating the average number of minutes’ rainfall experienced by each voting district
within voting hours. Taking predicted values, we find ∆Aˆ = 0.64,∆Rˆ = 0.7 and
∆Lˆ = −1.34.10 We calculate a vote-shift upper bound of 2.04, and a lower bound of
1.4. This suggests when measuring for timed exposure to rainfall, the estimate for the
minimum proportion of the remain advantage explained by vote-shift raises to 68%.
Such alternative measurements of rainfall may be of use in further investigations of
the vote-shift channel, as well as studies which seek to link non-political events to
electoral outcomes through their effect on mood (for example Busby et al., 2016).
In summary, we find evidence in support of both differential turnout (H2b) and
vote-shift (H3) as drivers of the remain rainfall advantage. Although we cannot reject
the possibility that vote-shift accounted for the entire remain advantage (due to the
constraints of decomposition), it is most likely that the two factors acted in combina-
tion. Interactive models show that the likely explanation for differential turnout was
not difference in voting habits between the two groups of supporters. Rather, the
rainfall had a disproportionate effect on older and poorer voters, disadvantaging the
Vote Leave campaign.
What if the Referendum Had Happened on a Sunny Day?
One of the immediate questions raised by studies of rainfall and elections is the ‘sunny
day’ counterfactual question: what if it didn’t rain? Indeed Gomez et al. (2007)
answered this question to speculate that rainfall may have swung the Electoral College
vote in 2000’s closely contested U.S. Presidential Election. We now use estimates
from Model 6 to show how the referendum results might have been affected if no
rain fell in any part of the UK on polling day, showing that despite relatively large
estimates of the rainfall effect, it had little substantive impact on the referendum
outcome.
10see full results in the Appendix
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We subtract the product of beta and the rainfall measurements for each district
from the recorded referendum results Yi−βRainXRaini . This results in predicted values
for the model output where rainfall is equal to 0 in all districts. From this we calculate
1,000 estimates of Lˆ(rain=0), Rˆ(rain=0) and Aˆ(rain=0) and display the resulting vote


























Figure 5.4: Estimates of the referendum result under conditions with no rainfall (grey
dotted segments) compared with the actual referendum result (black dots).
The conclusion evident from Figure 5.4 is that rainfall could not have swung the
result of the EU referendum. Even by a generous estimation for the remain vote
(taking the upper bound of the confidence interval) we calculate that the referendum
would have produced a win for Vote Leave: 51.9% to 48.1%, a result almost identical
to the actual results, a margin of approximately 1.29 million votes. The more likely
‘sunny day’ scenario (taking the point estimates in Figure 5.4) would increase the
advantage for Vote Leave: 52.2% - 47.8%, a margin of 1.48 million votes.
The counterfactual sunny day question also allows us to make estimations of the
number of votes lost to rainfall in each district. Table 5.4 shows the five districts in
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# District Region Remain votes lost to rainfall
1 Hackney London 558
2 Lambeth London 461
3 Lewisham London 247
4 Wandsworth London 212
5 Camden London 210
# District Region Leave votes lost to rainfall
1 Hillingdon London 4, 618
2 Havering London 2, 791
3 Harrow London 2, 494
4 Medway South East 2, 282
5 Basildon East 2, 195
Table 5.4: The top 5 districts most affected by rainfall for both remain and leave
which rainfall had greatest impact for both leave and remain. Unsurprisingly, rain
caused the most disruption in terms of lost votes in London and the South East where
rainfall was highest. This, combined with the relatively large populations of London
boroughs resulted in the largest losses of leave votes - with over 4,000 votes lost in
Hillingdon. Whilst remain losses were also concentrated in London, the numbers of
votes lost due to rainfall were far smaller.
Rainfall and Postal Votes: The Cost of Turning Out
A notable characteristic of the EU referendum was the increased adoption of postal
voting. The Electoral Commission (2017) reports that more than 8.5 million people
(18.4% of the electorate) requested a postal vote for the referendum, the highest level
ever for an election in the UK. Of the 33.6 million votes cast, 26.3 million were cast
in person, and the rest were postal or by proxy. 21.79% of all valid votes cast in the
referendum were postal. Therefore, the question of whether postal voting could be
suppressing the effect of rainfall requires further investigation, as postal votes are
not affected by polling day weather. The question is of wider significance to scholars
of voting patterns, since postal voting has been shown to eliminate some of the
costs associated with voting in person (Karp and Banducci, 2000; Wass et al., 2017;
Schelker and Schneiter, 2017). The findings we present below contribute tentatively



































Figure 5.5: The effect of 25 mm rainfall on referendum results as a function of postal
voting. The solid line represents change in the level of abstention (∆Aˆ), the dotted
line represents change in leave share (∆Lˆ) and the dashed line represents change in
remain share (∆Rˆ).
To test for the impact of postal voting, we include the percentage of postal votes
returned in each district into an interactive model with rainfall, otherwise identical to
Model 6. We find a significant direct effect of postal voting on RA, and a significant
interactive effect on LA.
11 Figure 5.5 illustrates this finding in terms of predicted
impact on vote share, revealing that increased postal voting significantly reduces the
magnitude of the rainfall effect on both the rate of abstention (∆Aˆ) and leave share
(∆Lˆ). Put simply, districts with high levels of postal voting were less impacted by
rainfall than those with low postal vote uptake. These findings support the argument
that postal voting eliminates costs associated with voting in person to a degree that
is empirically detectable.
Validation: Rainfall in the Error Term of Referendum Forecasting.
Our final piece of analysis is a robustness check, using pre-referendum forecasts of
leave share to test whether the addition of rainfall improves vote share prediction.
We hypothesise that if our models are correct, rainfall should be contributing to the
error in pre-referendum forecasting, causing a slight overestimation of leave share.
We take forecasts from a district level polling study using multilevel regression with
post-stratification (Lauderdale et al., 2017). Forecasts were made in 379 districts and
found a high level of predictive accuracy (.92 Pearson correlation coefficient). We first
run a bivariate OLS regression of final leave share results on forecast results in each
11See the Appendix for full regression results
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district. We then regress the errors of this regression on rainfall, finding a statistically
significant negative coefficient equal to a 0.11% reduction in leave share for each 1
mm rainfall. Leave vote share falls by 2.74% per inch of rainfall (25 mm) according to
how much error in polling forecasts is due to the unforeseen impact of rainfall. When
compared directly with the first difference estimate leave share of Model 6, we come
to strikingly similar conclusions. A 25mm increase in rainfall reduces leave share by
3.33% according to Model 6 (once accounting for the rate of abstention). For this
reason, we are confident that the rainfall effect is robust to out-of-model applications
such as reducing polling error. If election forecasters infer the expected direction and
magnitude of rainfall effects from the results of past elections, they may be able to
reduce polling error considerably, especially when heavy rain is forecast on election
day.
5.3 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have incorporated fine grained radar data into the most com-
prehensive national level analysis of the UK’s EU referendum of 2016. We achieved
a lower level of voting district disaggregation than the official results, and to our
knowledge we present the first electoral analysis of rainfall to restrict the measurement
of rainfall to voting hours. Our central conclusion is that rainfall had a substantial
effect on voting in several districts, but that the effect was too small to have decisively
swung the referendum’s final result.
Our key findings for the effect of rainfall on the UK’s EU Referendum were as
follows. First, we estimate relatively large estimates for the effect of rainfall on
turnout. A 25 mm (1 inch) increase in rainfall over 6 am - 10 pm results in a 2.45%
decrease in turnout, adjusted to 1.6% for the 24-hour period. Second, contrary to the
prediction of Ukip Leader Nigel Farage, we show that leave supporters were in fact
more likely to be deterred by rainfall than remain supporters. Third, we show that
a counterfactual referendum day without rainfall would most likely have widened
the gap between leave and remain, conclusively answering any question of whether
rainfall (or lack thereof) could have changed the result.
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We also find results of wider interest to election specialists. First, we find that
postal voting suppressed the effect of rainfall on turnout and leave share, indicating
that postal voting has the effect of nullifying the potential hindrances to voting on
polling day. Electoral commissions could therefore do more to reduce the rainfall effect
by encouraging alternative voting methods such as free postal voting. Second, we
find evidence to support the psychological effects of rainfall on vote share (vote-shift).
Third, we find evidence to show that polling analysts may be able to reduce forecasting
error by taking into account rain forecasts when the expected direction of effect is
known.
What do our findings tell us about the relationship between elections and rainfall
in general? Most importantly, our findings suggest that rainfall probably cannot swing
the results of referendums or proportionally allocated parliamentary elections unless
those elections are extremely close. However, given that we find several districts
were likely to have lost thousands of votes in the EU Referendum that was seen as
particularly divisive, highly salient and ‘close’ (at least before the fact), our study
shows that there is room for conjecture on the impact of rainfall in close elections
elsewhere.
On the one hand, Fraga and Hersh (2011) show that the effect of rainfall in the U.S.
Electoral College is confined to elections that are not close, arguing that the weight
of get-out-the-vote campaigning in close states helps voters to overcome election day
costs. On the other hand, our findings, combined with new psychologically motivated
studies of vote-shift (Horiuchi and Kang, 2017) and the impact of apparently irrelevant
events on political outcomes (Busby et al., 2016) suggest that the question of the
rainfall effect in close elections ought to be revisited – particularly outside the US,
where election campaigns are less well funded. Targeted studies of rainfall in close




This thesis has taken a rigorous approach to the analysis of political behaviour in
the United Kingdom and presents novel findings that improve our understanding of
British Politics. Here, I reflect upon the findings of each individual chapter, before
discussing the wider connections and contributions of the thesis within the field of
political science. I then conclude by considering the importance of data collection
and analysis to the study of British politics.
Chapter 2 studies the effect of plenary access on partisanship in Prime Minister’s
Questions. The results of a natural experiment show that decreased access to the
floor has the effect of increasing the proportion of questions that aim to directly
admonish a political opponent. These findings align with expectations of the ‘plenary
bottleneck’ theory of legislative organisation. Of course, the plenary bottleneck
theory (Cox, 2006) explains the slow moving development of party discipline and the
gradual removal of the rights of backbench MPs to delay the passage of legislation,
whereas the study in Chapter 2 deals with parties’ fluctuating access to parliamentary
debate. However – in both empirical examples – analogous mechanisms underlying
the activation of party discipline apply. In the case of the slow development of the
government-opposition dynamic in 19th century Britain, low levels of party discipline
and fewer restrictions on the rights of individual members to delay the passage of
bills brought Parliament to deadlock. The legislature could not meet the growing
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requirement for more legislation to keep up with the pace of modernisation across
the country, necessitating anti-dilatory reforms in order to improve the efficiency of
governance.
In the case of access to the floor in PMQs, a similar logic applies at the party
level. As a party’s access to the floor in PMQs is removed, demand for plenary time
outstrips supply. In the situation where access to the floor is scarce, the members
chosen by random ballot to speak on behalf of their party must converge on an
approach that broadly represents the party’s position in the most efficient way. As
previous studies of parliamentary voting have shown (Dewan and Spirling, 2011;
Hix and Noury, 2016), parties in Westminster style systems generally achieve this
efficiency by voting in a partisan government-opposition manner. Chapter 2 shows
much the same manifestation of efficiency in parliamentary speech: as access to
speaking time is curtailed, speech becomes more partisan.
Chapter 3 – which examines strategic party disloyalty among backbench MPs –
chooses from two theories competing for the explanation of why party disloyalty is
higher for governing parties than it is for opposition parties. On first glance, the
theorisation is simple: governing parties have greater difficulty with disloyalty because
they are larger, more ideologically diverse, and contain a greater number of new MPs
from marginal constituencies who may seek to stake out a centrist position in the
legislature. Our analysis shows that this theory is not supported by the evidence.
Firstly, it is incumbent MPs who drive increases in party disloyalty when their party
moves from opposition to government. Secondly, instead of increased rebellions in
Parliament being driven by centrist, non-partisan MPs, it is MPs from the extreme
wings of either the Labour Party or the Conservative Party who rebel more often.
Finally, marginality – the extent to which an MP’s seat in parliament is electorally
secure – also has no effect on the likelihood of rebellion.
Our theory suggests that the explanation for this empirical pattern is based in the
relationship many ideologically extreme Members of Parliament have with the voters
in their constituency. MPs who see their political base as somewhat more extreme than
the centre of their party have the incentive to signal their ideological independence
to their base at every opportunity. However, when a party is in opposition, a vote
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against one’s own party is by definition a vote for the policy of the government.
Ideologically extreme MPs would far rather oppose a government’s bill than oppose
their own party. It is only when in government that the incentive to rebel against the
party aligns with the electoral interests of more ideologically extreme MPs. In this
case, a centrist government proposal may be portrayed as a betrayal of the party’s
values, and so provides an opportunity for extreme MPs to signal their independence.
In fact, we show that not only do ideologically extreme MPs rebel more often when
in government, they are almost three times more likely to attach an explanatory
‘grandstanding’ speech to explain their vote to the base.
Chapter 4 analyses early career progression and first promotions among MPs in
the House of Commons, finding new evidence to support a link between legislative
behaviour at the individual level and eventual career prospects, complementing
previous research into the effect of party loyalty in voting and career progression in
Britain (Piper, 1991; Kam, 2006; Benedetto and Hix, 2007). Chapter 4 also makes
a contribution to the growing literature that makes use of parliamentary speech
for the measurement of non-ideological latent dimensions (Killermann and Proksch,
2013; Proksch and Slapin, 2015; Kellermann, 2016). The finding that parliamentary
debate may also reflect the underlying politics behind political appointments gives
further credence to the use of parliamentary debate as a means by which to measure
meaningful dimensions of parliamentary behaviour.
The strongest results in Chapter 4 show that the higher the participation in
parliamentary debate, the higher the likelihood of ministerial selection. This central
finding is accompanied by results suggesting that the content of speeches may also
have an important role to play in career progression. The key argument for a causal
effect of speechmaking on career progression is that speeches affect the likelihood of
progression to parliamentary roles that require strong skills in speech, while the role
of whip remains unaffected by any form of political speech measure, as whips are not
permitted to speak in the House.
Chapter 5, which considers the effect of rainfall on voting in the referendum on
membership of the European Union, provides a detailed and innovative answer to a
perennial question asked of close elections: “could the rain have swung the result?”.
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Our study combined highly detailed radar-based rainfall data (tailored specifically to
polling station opening hours) with a complete electoral analysis of the referendum
vote across the United Kingdom. We overcome several methodological challenges in
measuring the effect of rainfall on the result of the referendum. First, our sample
contained a relatively small number of observations and no repeats of observations
over time. Since previous studies studies rely on time-series estimations of the effect
of rainfall, we had to find an effective way for accounting for the confounding effects
of spatial dependence of rainfall across the country. We apply a recently developed
balancing procedure that reduces the dependence between pre-treatment covariates
and a continuous treatment (Fong et al., 2017), allowing for an unbiased estimate of
the effect of rainfall on the referendum results. Second, since a shift in the election
result due to rainfall could have been mediated through a swing in vote choice or
through suppressing turnout differentially, we applied compositional analysis with
seemingly unrelated regression estimation.
Our results showed substantial estimates for the negative effect of rainfall on
turnout. A 25 mm (1 inch) increase in rainfall over 6 am - 10 pm results in a 2.45%
decrease in turnout, adjusted to 1.6% for the 24-hour period. We found that the
effect of rainfall was more detrimental to the leave vote than it was for remain, and
convincing evidence in line with psychological theory that rainfall caused groups of
people to become more risk-averse in their decision making, which resulted in voters
switching their vote choice from leave to remain. We found that, if no rain had fallen
on the day of the referendum, the gap between leave and remain would have been
greater than the actual referendum result. We also showed that the effect of rainfall
was less pronounced in districts with a greater uptake of postal voting, implying that
electoral commissions may be able to minimise the impact of election day shocks by
encouraging the uptake of postal voting. Finally, we found that rainfall data made
small but significant improvements to the estimates of a polling day forecast of the
referendum results.
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6.1 The Necessity of Comparison in
Single-Country Studies
One of the seductions of producing political science research on a single country is the
danger of failing to recognise and apply the general contributions of the international
discipline. A primary lesson of this thesis is that the politics of one democratic
country must be seen in the context of others: that cross-national differences are
usually incremental, not categorical or essential. In writing this Ph.D, a common
finding has been how readily theories of political processes apply to the British case:
Chapter 2 adapts a general theory of legislative organisation to show that party
cohesion in the House of Commons depends in part on the demand for parliamentary
speech time (Cox, 2006). This finding is new in the study of British politics, but the
principles applied here could be readily applied across different legislatures with proper
understanding of the dynamics of parliamentary speech across legislative systems
(Proksch and Slapin, 2015). Chapter 3 shows that ideologically extreme legislators in
the United States House of Representatives and Britain’s House of Commons behave
similarly when moving between majority and minority status. When in the majority,
legislators in both systems are more likely to publicly rebel against their own party.
When in the minority, legislators in both systems become more loyal. Despite the
fact that the House of Commons and the House of Representatives are often thought
to be categorically different in terms of legislative behaviour, increasingly we find
that the presumed differences between systems are sometimes due to the differences
in modes of study, rather than empirical realities.
Chapter 4 approaches career progression from a perspective that is more frequently
used to study American politics and the politics of presidential systems in Latin
America. Whilst studies of political elites in Westminster tend to focus on cabinet
politics and the selection of senior politicians, Chapter 4 theorises the legislative
behaviour of new MPs in the literature. The findings help to reveal how progressive
ambition in parliamentary systems manifests itself in terms of legislative behaviour
and how ambitious politicians approach the task of representation. Without reference
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to external applications of progressive ambition (Schlesinger, 1966; Herrick and Moore,
1993; Sieberer and Mu¨ller, 2017) and developments in the theorisation and analysis of
parliamentary speech (Proksch and Slapin, 2015), this chapter would not have been
possible.
Finally, Chapter 5 analyses the effect of rainfall on Britain’s 2016 EU Referendum.
Despite the relative complexity of the empirical task and the fact that referendums
are quite different to general elections, we found similar effects of rainfall to other
studies in the field. Our overall estimate of the effect of rainfall was higher relative to
other studies – which measure rainfall over a 24 hour period – but when accounting
for our reduced window of measurement (between 6am and 10pm), our estimate falls
within the expected range of previous studies. Our analysis also found vote-switching
effects similar to those discovered in studies of American elections (Horiuchi and
Kang, 2017; Bassi and Williams, 2017) in which rainfall elicits a risk-averse response
from groups of voters.
In summary, this thesis has focused on British political institutions and the
political behaviour therein, but it has done so with reference to – and comparison
with – studies of parliamentary and presidential democracies around the world. This
approach to political research not only improves the intrinsic quality of research
findings – we come closer to some sense of objective social truth – but it also helps
researchers who study different political systems to more easily reflect on and compare
with their own cases of study. Hopefully, this thesis will contribute to the study of
political behaviour both within and outside the United Kingdom.
6.2 Improving Understanding with Better
Information
For each substantive chapter of this thesis, I have (in collaboration with co-authors
in Chapters 2 and 4) undertaken large-scale data collection efforts in British politics.
Chapter 2 collects together information on the application and use of parliamentary
questions in PMQs (a first analysis of new data) which could be used to study
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other important aspects of legislative behaviour, including the explanation of gender
differences in participation in parliamentary debate. Chapter 3 brings together a
very large data set of parliamentary speeches, voting behaviour, electoral data and
a complete time-series of parliamentary careers from 1979-2016. These data is now
published and in the public domain for use in further studies of British politics.
Chapter 4 collects the political speeches and early paths of MPs from as early as 1945,
combined with information on their social and professional backgrounds. Finally,
Chapter 5 presents fine-grained radar data alongside electoral data from the whole
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. To our knowledge, this is still the most
geographically inclusive statistical analysis of the EU Referendum.
Of course, no dataset is perfect and there is still much work to be done in expanding
and improving the data used here and also the collection of publicly available data
for the study of British politics in general. As the capacity among students of British
politics to make use of quantitative data increases, so will the demand for reliable and
easy-to-access data in this field. Beyond the thesis itself, I hope a lasting contribution
of this project will be the efforts taken by myself and my colleagues to gather and
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